

AF FORM 8, 20061208

PREVIOUS EDITIONS ARE OBSOLETE

AF FORM 8 CONTINUATION SHEET															
IV.	COMMENTS														
EXAMINER'S REMARKS:															
<p>A. Mission Description. Maj Siems briefed, led, and instructed a single-ship recurring ASC Mission Evaluation from Whiteman AFB, MO. The scenario was flown using medium altitude tactics to include urban CAS situations in an increased threat Operation Enduring Freedom environment to Truman MOA. ASC consisted of type II attack control with a 2 ship of A-10s. The mission was conducted with actual JTACs. Instruction during the brief, flight, and debrief consisted of JDAM with follow on strafe geometry and a chased LATN. Lt Col Roe, 303 FS/ADO, was debriefed on mission results. All required items were accomplished IAW AF1 11-2A/OA-10 Vol 2.</p>															
<table style="width: 100%; border-collapse: collapse;"> <tr> <td style="text-align: center; padding: 2px;">Air-to-Ground</td> <td style="text-align: center; padding: 2px;">Score</td> </tr> <tr> <td style="text-align: center; padding: 2px;">Weapon</td> <td></td> </tr> <tr> <td style="padding: 2px;">LRS</td> <td style="text-align: center; padding: 2px;">HIT*/HIT*</td> </tr> <tr> <td style="padding: 2px;">HAS</td> <td style="text-align: center; padding: 2px;">HIT*/HIT*</td> </tr> <tr> <td style="padding: 2px;">HARR</td> <td style="text-align: center; padding: 2px;">HIT*</td> </tr> <tr> <td style="padding: 2px;">IAM</td> <td style="text-align: center; padding: 2px;">HIT*</td> </tr> <tr> <td style="padding: 2px;">* VTR Assessed</td> <td></td> </tr> </table>	Air-to-Ground	Score	Weapon		LRS	HIT*/HIT*	HAS	HIT*/HIT*	HARR	HIT*	IAM	HIT*	* VTR Assessed		
Air-to-Ground	Score														
Weapon															
LRS	HIT*/HIT*														
HAS	HIT*/HIT*														
HARR	HIT*														
IAM	HIT*														
* VTR Assessed															
<p>B. Discrepancies. None.</p> <p>C. Recommended Additional Training. None.</p> <p>D. Additional Comments. None.</p> <p>REVIEWING OFFICER'S REMARKS: None.</p> <p>APPROVING OFFICER'S REMARKS: None.</p> <p>ADDITIONAL REVIEWS:</p> <p>442 OG/CC [REDACTED]</p> <p>442 OG/OGV [REDACTED]</p>															
PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT															
<p><small>AUTHORITY: 10 USC 8013; EO 9397</small></p> <p><small>PRINCIPAL PURPOSE: Source document used to establish and record aircrew qualification</small></p> <p><small>DISCLOSURE IS VOLUNTARY: SSAN is used to establish individual identity. Failure to provide may prevent qualification authorization and result in a loss of records establishing qualification.</small></p>															
AF FORM 8, 20081208 (REVERSES)															

A-10C, T/N 79-0164, 22 May 2013

PREVIOUS EDITIONS ARE OBSOLETE

[illegible]

G3. MAINTENANCE TRAINING RECORDS

Not applicable

INTENTIONALLY

LEFT

BLANK

G4. MAJ BRIAN L. LEITER WIC FEB RECORDS

STAFF SUMMARY SHEET					
TO	ACTION	SIGNATURE (SURNAME), GRADE AND DATE	TO	ACTION	SIGNATURE (SURNAME), GRADE AND DATE
A3TT	Coord		6 ACV	Coord	
2 DA2A3	Coord		7 CV	Coord	
3 A2A3	Coord		8 CC	Sign	
4 CVEA	Log		9		
5 CVE	Coord		10		
SURNAME OF ACTION OFFICER AND GRADE		SYMBOL	PHONE		SUSPENSE DATE
Karen Grissinger		A3TF			kg
SUBJECT					
Flying Evaluation Board (FEB) Waiver Request - Capt Brian L. Leiter,					
DATE					
SUMMARY					
<p>1. PURPOSE: To obtain AFRC/CC approval of FEB waiver for Capt Brian L. Leiter (Tab 1) and approve the 303 FS CC's recommendation to return Capt Leiter to the A-10 (Tab 2).</p> <p>2. DISCUSSION:</p> <p>a. Capt Leiter is an Air Reserve Technician assigned to an API 1 position (01253901C) with the 442 FW, 303 FS, Whiteman AFB MO, as an A-10 instructor pilot. He was selected to attend the A-10 Weapons Instructor Course at Nellis AFB NV and was eliminated from the course effective 3 Oct 07 for failure to meet the requirements of the syllabus. Capt Leiter returned to the 303 FS and is currently suspended from flying until the FEB waiver is proved.</p> <p>b. Tab 3 provides comments from the 303 FS DO.</p> <p>c. HQ AFRC/JA has reviewed the FEB waiver package and found it to be legally sufficient (Tab 4).</p> <p>d. 10 AF/A2A3 concurs with the FEB waiver and the recommendation to return Capt Leiter to flying the A-10 at Whiteman (Tab 4).</p> <p>e. Tab 5 contains the 57 WG/CC and USAFWC elimination information.</p> <p>3. RECOMMENDATION: AFRC/CC sign memo at Tab 1 approving the FEB waiver and allow Capt Leiter to return to flying as an A-10 instructor pilot with the 303 FS, Whiteman AFB MO.</p>					
 PHILIP A. IANNUZZI, JR., Colonel, USAF Chief, Training and Tactics Division					
5 Tabs 1. Proposed Memo 2. 303 FS/CC Recommendation 3. AFRC/JA Legal Review 4. 10 AF Endorsement 5. Elimination Information					



DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
AIR FORCE RESERVE COMMAND




MEMORANDUM FOR 10 AF/A2A3

FROM: AFRC/CC
1150 Air Force Pentagon, Room 4E160
Washington DC 20330-1150

SUBJECT: Request for Flying Evaluation Board (FEB) Waiver – Capt Brian L. Leiter,
[REDACTED]

1. Review of the FEB package meets all minimum requirements in accordance with AFI 11-402, Chap 4. I approve the FEB waiver request to allow Capt Leiter to remain qualified for aviation service and to return to flying the A-10 at Whiteman AFB MO.
2. HQ AFRC POC is CMSgt Roger Brodzinski, DSN 497-1145 or Karen Grissinger, DSN 497-0532.

[REDACTED]
JOHN A. BRADLEY, Lt Gen, USAF
Commander

STAFF SUMMARY SHEET							
	TO	ACTION	SIGNATURE (Surname), GRADE AND DATE		TO	ACTION	SIGNATURE (Surname), GRADE AND DATE
1	57 WG/CS	Coord		6	USAFWC/CC	Sign	
2	57 WG/CV	Coord		7			
3	57 WG/CC	Coord/Sign		8			
4	USAFWC/CS	Coord		9			
5	USAFWC/CV	Coord		10			
SURNAME OF ACTION OFFICER AND GRADE			SYMBOL	PHONE		TYPIST'S INITIALS	SUSPENSE DATE
Remigio, GS -9			WSQR	2-5230		DR	
SUBJECT							DATE
Request for FEB Waiver --Capt Brian L. Leiter, Class 07B - 66 WPS/A-10 WIC							20071003
SUMMARY							
<p>1. Captain John L. Leiter failed to meet the course standards of the A-10 Weapons Instructor Course and has been eliminated from the Weapons School.</p> <p>2. In accordance with AFI 11-402/ACC Supplement I, Captain Leiter was offered and accepted the opportunity to request a waiver of a Flying Evaluation Board. He fully understands the ramifications of his decision should HQ ACC and AFRC disapprove the waiver.</p> <p>3. RECOMMENDATION: 57 WG/CC and USAFWC/CC sign indorsements.</p> <p></p> <p>SCOTT A. KINDSVATER, Col, USAF Commandant</p> <p>I Tab USAFWS/CO Ltr w/5 Atchs</p>							

AF IMT 1768, 19840901, V5

PREVIOUS EDITION WILL BE USED



**DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
USAF WEAPONS SCHOOL (ACC)
NELLIS AIR FORCE BASE NEVADA**

3 Oct 2007

MEMORANDUM FOR 57 WG/CC
USAFWC/CC
HQ ACC/A3
IN TURN

FROM: USAF WS/CO
4269 Tyndall Avenue
Nellis AFB NV 89191-6074

SUBJECT: Request for FEB Waiver--Captain Brian L. Leiter

1. I have eliminated Captain Brian L. Leiter from the A-10 Weapons Instructor Course, Class 07B, for failure to meet the requirements of the syllabus.
2. I recommend a waiver of a Flying Evaluation Board (FEB) because Capt Leiter's flying performance does not support removing him from flight status.



SCOTT A. KINDSVATER, Colonel, USAF
Commandant

Attachments:

1. FEB Waiver Letter
2. Opportunity to Request FEB
3. Elimination from USAFWS WIC, Class 07B Ltr
4. Operations Summary
5. Gradebook Closeout

Global Power For America

1st Ind to USAFWS/CO, Elimination from Weapons Instructor Course

57 WG/CC

MEMORANDUM FOR USAFWC/CC

I concur with the waiver request for an FEB for Captain Brian L. Leiter. It is my recommendation that he be returned to his operational assignment upon waiver approval from HQ AFRC/A3.

STEPHEN L. HOOG
Brigadier General, USAF
Commander

2d Ind, USAFWC/CC

MEMORANDUM FOR HQ ACC/A3 and HQ AFRC/A3

Recommend approval of the attached request for a waiver of an FEB for Capt Brian L. Leiter.

R. MICHAEL WORDEN
Major General, USAF
Commander



**DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
UNITED STATES AIR FORCE WEAPONS SCHOOL (ACC)
NELLIS AIR FORCE BASE NEVADA**

3 October 2007

MEMORANDUM FOR 66 WPS/CC

FROM: Capt Brian L. Leiter

SUBJECT: Flying Evaluation Board (FEB) Waiver

1. I, Capt Brian L. Leiter, am requesting an FEB Waiver. Reference "USAFWS/CO letter dated 3 October 07, SUBJECT: Opportunity to Request FEB Waiver."
2. This request is submitted after being advised of my right to seek legal counsel which I hereby decline, and with the understanding that:
 - a. Approval of the request for waiver entails waiving my right to challenge the elimination action.
 - b. If any level of reviewing authority disapproves this request, I will be returned to active aviation status to appear before a FEB.
 - c. Final approval authority is HQ AFRC/A3.
 - d. My elimination from this course may preclude entry into a similar training program.



BRIAN L. LEITER, Capt, USAF

Capt Leiter was advised of his rights and privileges to seek advice from legal counsel.



DAVID W. HICKS, Lt Col, USAF
Commander

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: 10 U.S.C. 8013 and EO 9397

PURPOSE: To provide information for processing request for waiver of a Flying Evaluation Board

ROUTINE USES: None

DISCLOSURE IS: Voluntary. However, nondisclosure may delay aviation service action.

This document contains information which must be protected IAW AFI 33-332 and DoD Regulation 5400.11; Privacy Act of 1974 as amended applies, and is For Official Use Only (FOUO).

Global Power For America



DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
UNITED STATES AIR FORCE WEAPONS SCHOOL (ACC)
NELLIS AIR FORCE BASE NEVADA

3 October 2007

MEMORANDUM FOR CAPTAIN BRIAN L. LEITER

FROM: USAFWS/CO

SUBJECT: Opportunity to Request FEB Waiver

1. You are suspended from aviation service effective 3 October 2007. As of 3 Oct 2007, your aviation service code ASC 1A will change to ASC 04 and your aviation career incentive pay will cease.
2. In accordance with AFI 11-402, paragraph 4.7 and ACC Supplement 1, I am offering you the opportunity to request a waiver to a Flying Evaluation Board (FEB). If you choose not to request a FEB waiver, proceedings to convene a FEB will be initiated. Reviewing authorities at any level may deny the waiver request and direct a FEB.
3. The suspension is for your inability to show satisfactory progress in the USAF A-10 Weapons Instructor Course (WIC). The reasons for this decision are as follows:
 - a. Your unsatisfactory training progress in mission execution during the Weapons phase of training and weapons officer presence during instructional briefs and debriefs.
 - b. Your performance of basic flying skills is satisfactory.
 - c. Your displayed judgment qualities are commensurate with your experience level.
4. Military legal counsel can be obtained to advise you of your rights under FEB action and FEB Waiver action. You will have complete access to your training records for review with your counsel.
5. Acknowledge receipt of this letter and return it to me within five working days.



SCOTT A. KINDSVATER, Colonel, USAF
Commandant

This document contains information which must be protected IAW AFI 33-332 and DoD Regulation 5400.11; Privacy Act of 1974 as amended applies, and is For Official Use Only (FOUO).

Global Power For America

1st Ind to USAFWS/CO, 3 October 2007, Opportunity to Request FEB Waiver

Captain Brian L. Leiter

MEMORANDUM FOR USAFWS/CO

I acknowledge receipt of this letter.



BRIAN L. LEITER, Capt, USAF



DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
UNITED STATES AIR FORCE WEAPONS SCHOOL (ACC)
NELLIS AIR FORCE BASE NEVADA

3 Oct 2007

MEMORANDUM FOR CAPT BRIAN L. LEITER

FROM: USAFWS/CO

SUBJECT: Elimination from USAF Weapons Instructor Course

1. You are hereby eliminated from participation in USAF Weapons Instructor Course 07B. The reason for this action is your substandard performance throughout the course culminating in your failure of the Weapons (WPNS) phase, WPNS-5. Your inability to show timely progression indicates the need to eliminate you from the course.
2. Your performance of basic mission skills was satisfactory and commensurate with your experience level.


SCOTT A. KINDSVATER, Colonel, USAF
Commandant

1st Ind, Capt Brian L. Leiter

MEMORANDUM FOR USAFWS/CO

I acknowledge receipt on 3 OCT 07
(date)


BRIAN L. LEITER, Captain, USAF

This document contains information which must be protected IAW AFI 33-332 and DoD Regulation 5400.11; Privacy Act of 1974 as amended applies, and is For Official Use Only (FOUO)

Global Power For America



Department of the Air Force
UNITED STATES AIR FORCE WEAPONS SCHOOL (ACC)
NELLIS AIR FORCE BASE NEVADA

2 Oct 07

MEMORANDUM FOR USAFWS/CO

FROM: 66 WPS/CC

SUBJECT: Operations Summary

1. Capt Leiter has flown 10 additional sorties in the first 17 missions of the A-10 Weapons Instructor Course (WIC). He flew two extra sorties due to maintenance and 8 as a result of student non-progression. He flew one extra BFM-3 sortie (student led defensive BFM), one extra AG-2 sortie (student led computed deliveries), one extra AG-3 sortie (student led high-threat deliveries), two extra CAS-3 sorties (student led 4-ship medium threat), and three extra WPN-5 sorties (student led night attacks). One WSEP-1 sortie was reflight due to AGM-65 failure on a Combat Hammer mission and one WPN-2 sortie was reflight due to targeting pod and JDAM failures on a dedicated PGM employment ride. Captain Leiter's continued poor performance reflects a lack of proficiency and experience required by WIC students at this stage of the course.

2. Capt Leiter epitomizes the caliber of officer and individual we expect at the Weapons School. His attitude and desire to learn were outstanding throughout the course. He has made improvements since the beginning of the course but his inability to achieve syllabus standards within the allotted time and available resources requires his elimination from the course. Capt Leiter's basic A-10 core competencies are not in question and he remains a valuable Air Force asset. He will continue to perform well in the A-10 as an instructor pilot.



Global Power For America



DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
UNITED STATES AIR FORCE WEAPONS SCHOOL (ACC)
NELLIS AIR FORCE BASE NEVADA

3 Oct 2007

MEMORANDUM FOR USAFWS/CO

FROM: 66 WPS/CC

SUBJECT: Sortie Effectiveness Summary (Capt Brian L. Leiter)

The following is a summary of Capt Leiter's A-10 WIC sorties:

Date	Mission	Grade	Remarks	Instructor
19 Jul 07	BFM-1	E		Campbell
23 Jul 07	BFM-2	E		Behmer
25 Jul 07	BFM-3	SNP	N/E for execution	Cusson
26 Jul 07	BFM-3X	E		Eichelberger
30 Jul 07	AG-1	E		Eichelberger
2 Aug 07	AG-2	SNP	N/E for execution	Behmer
6 Aug 07	AG-2X	E		McCracken
7 Aug 07	AG-3	SNP	N/E for execution	Eichelberger
9 Aug 07	AG-3X	E		Haden
14 Aug 07	AGWE-1	NE-MX		Eichelberger
15 Aug 07	AGWE-1	E		Haden
16 Aug 07	AG-4	E		Cusson
20 Aug 07	WE-1	E		Hicks
22 Aug 07	WE-2	NE-MX		Curley
23 Aug 07	WE-2	E		Eichelberger
27 Aug 07	WE-6	E		McCracken
29 Aug 07	WE-5	SNP	N/E for execution	Mills
30 Aug 07	WE-5X	SNP	N/E for execution	Haden
6 Sep 07	WE-3	E		Mills
7 Sep 07	WE-4	E		Behmer
11 Sep 07	CAS-1	E		Campbell
17 Sep 07	CAS-2	E		Eichelberger
20 Sep 07	CAS-3	SNP	N/E for execution	McCracken
24 Sep 07	CAS-3X	SNP	N/E for execution	Gingras
26 Sep 07	CAS-3P	Pass		Hicks
01 Oct 07	WPN-5XX	SNP	N/E for execution	Curley



Global Power For America



**DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
UNITED STATES AIR FORCE WEAPONS SCHOOL (ACC)
NELLIS AIR FORCE BASE NEVADA**


3 October 2007

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

FROM: 66 WPS/CC

SUBJECT: Gradebook Closeout for Capt Brian L. Leiter

1. Capt Leiter participated in 17 of 35 syllabus missions IAW the A-10 Weapons Instructor Course (WIC) syllabus and failed to pass 8 missions.
2. Capt Leiter completed 11 academic tests, for an average score of 94.56 percent.




This document contains information which must be protected IAW AFI 33-332 and DoD Regulation 5400.11; Privacy Act of 1974 as amended applies, and is For Official Use Only (FOUO).

Global Power For America

G5. LETTER OF QUALIFICATIONS

303d Fighter Squadron
LETTER OF QUALIFICATIONS

MAY 2013

		STATUS	* REASON	FLIGHT	EXP	OPS SUP	SOF	FE	FLT LEAD / SS	IP	TGP LASDT	MCC	WX CAT	ANTI-HELO	FAC(A)	CSAR				N/G LAND	LASDT CATEGORY	HELMET (D, X, or I)	FCF	REMARK/RESTRICTIONS		
LAST NAME																SANDY 4	SANDY 3	SANDY 2	SANDY 1						CSAR IP	
AMEY	P-BMC			A	E				4	X						X	X	X		X	2					
ARMBRUSTER	N-CMRA	F, A		D	I								3							X	2					
BABBITT	CMR-A			B	I				2	X			2		X	X				X	2					
BERRY	CMR			B	I				SS	X			3							X	2			2 FL DACT		
BEVER	BMC			B	E	X	X	X	4	X	X	X	1			X	X	X	X	X	3					
BOBLET	CMR			B	E	X	X	X	4	X	X	X	2	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	3					
BORGEN	BMC			A	E	X	X	X	4	X	X	X	1		X	X	X	X	X	X	3	D				
CARLSON	P-CMR			D	I				SS	X			3							X	2					
CARLTON	CMR			D	E	X	X	X	4	X	X	X	1	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	3	I	X			
CHAPPEL	CMR			B	E	X	X	X	4	X	X	X	1		X	X	X	X	X	X	3	I	X			
DECKER	CMR			A	E		X		4	X			2		X	X				X	2					
DILLON	P-CMRA			C	I								3							X	1					
DORAN	P-CMRA			D	E	X	X		4	X	X	1		X	X	X				X	3		X			
DUCKWORTH	N-BMC	F, A			E				4	X	X	1	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	3					
ECKFELD	BMC			D	E				4	X		1		X						X	2					
ERNEWEIN	CMR			C	E	X	X		4	X	X	X	1	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	3			NO AFAC until w/IP		
GLEN	N-CMRA	F, A		C	I				SS	X		2								X	2					
GODWIN	CMR			C	E	X	X		4	X	X	X	1	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	3					
GOSTOMSKI	CMR			B	E	X	X	X	4	X	X	X	1	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	3					
HAWKINS	CMR			B	E		X		4	X	X	X	1		X					X	2					
HAYES	CMR			C	E	X	X		4	X	X	X	1	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	3					
HEGTVEDT	LCT			D	I								3							X	1					
HODGES	CMR			A	E	X	X		4	X	X	1								X	3	D		4 FL DACT		
JOHNS	P-CMRA			A	I				4	X		2		X	X					X	2			2 FL DACT, 4 FL DACT		
KENT	N-BMC	R			E				4	X		2		X	X	X				X	1					
LEITER	CMR			A	E	X	X		4	X	X	X	1	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	3	D	X			
LEONAS	CMR			B	E	X	X	X	4	X	X	1		X	X	X	X	X	X	X	3	D	X			
LINDERMAN	CMR			A	E	X	X		4	X	X	2		X	X	X	X	X	X	X	3					
LOEFFLER	CMR			C	I								3							X	2					
LORANGER	P-CMRA			B	E				SS	X		1								X	2					
MAGANN	CMR			D	E	X	X		4	X	X	2		X	X	X	X	X	X	X	3	D		4 FL DACT		
MANTER	CMR			A	I								3							X	1					
MARKS	CMR			D	E	X	X	X	4	X	X	X	1	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	3	I	X			
MCCONNELL	CMR			C	E	X	X	X	4	X	X	X	2	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	3	I				
MCNURLIN	P-CMR			A	E		X		4	X	X	X	1	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	3	I				
MURPHY	BMC			D	E	X	X		4	X		1								X	2			Day TGP LASDT Only		
NESTER	CMR			B	E	X	X		4	X	X	X	1	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	3	D				
OREK, A	CMR			B	E				2	X		2								X	2					
OREK, M	CMR			A	E				4	X		2								X	2					
ORR	CMR			A	E		X		4	X		2	X	X	X					X	2					
PLAKYDA	CMR			B	E	X	X		4	X	X	2		X						X	3	D				
RAMOS	CMR			A	E	X	X		4	X	X	X	1	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	3	I	X			
RIDDLE	CMR			D	E	X	X		4	X	X	2		X						X	3	D				
ROE	CMR			C	E	X	X	X	4	X	X	X	1	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	3	I		4 FL DACT		
RUDELL	P-CMRA			B	E				4	X	X	2		X	X	X	X	X	X	X	3	D				
SAUGSTAD	CMR			D	E				4	X		2								X	2			4FL DACT		
SAUR	CMR			C	E				SS	X		1		X						X	2					
SCHRIEVER	CMR			B	E				SS	X		2	X							X	2					
SHELTON	CMR			C	E				4	X		1		X						X	2					
SHETTERLY	P-CMRA			B	E		X		4	X	X	1		X	X	X				X	3					
SHIPMAN	CMR			B	E				4	X	X	2		X						X	2	D		4 FLT DACT		
SIEMS	CMR			D	E	X	X	X	4	X	X	X	2		X	X	X	X	X	X	3		X			
STONE	CMR			D	E	X	X	X	4	X	X	X	1		X	X	X	X	X	X	3					
LAST NAME	STATUS	* REASON	FLIGHT	EXP	OPS SUP	SOF	FE	FLT LEAD / SS	IP	TGP LASDT	MCC	WX CAT	ANTI-HELO	FAC(A)	SANDY 4	SANDY 3	SANDY 2	SANDY 1	CSAR	IP	N/G LAND	LASDT CATEGORY	HELMET	FCF	REMARK/RESTRICTIONS	
P=Probation * F=Flying lookback A = ACBT G = Ground training R = AAR V = Verification S = FMT (Active Duty Only) SS=SS - AAR & Range CMR-A = Active Duty																										

INTENTIONALLY

LEFT

BLANK

TAB H

EGRESS, IMPACT, AND CRASHORTHINESS ANALYSIS

THIS TAB NOT USED

INTENTIONALLY

LEFT

BLANK

TAB I
DEFICIENCY REPORTS

THIS TAB NOT USED

INTENTIONALLY

LEFT

BLANK

TAB J

RELEASABLE TECHNICAL REPORTS AND ENGINEERING EVALUATIONS

THIS TAB NOT USED

INTENTIONALLY

LEFT

BLANK

TAB K

MISSION RECORDS AND DATA

K1.	FLIGHT PLAN AND FLIGHT ORDERS	K-3
K1.1.	ARMS FIGHTER FLIGHT AUTHORIZATION	K-3
K1.2.	PEX FLYING SCHEDULE	K-5
K1.3.	NOTAMS	K-7
K1.4.	DEUCE 01 RISK MANAGEMENT WORKSHEET	K-15
K1.5.	AHAS RISK ASSESSMENT	K-17
K2.	AIRCRAFT WEIGHT AND BALANCE	K-21

INTENTIONALLY

LEFT

BLANK

K1. FLIGHT PLAN AND FLIGHT ORDERS

K1.1. ARMS FIGHTER FLIGHT AUTHORIZATION

CONSECUTIVE USE - IF'S APPROVED: ARMS Fighter Flight Authorization

HOME STATION	Order No	Unit	Depart on or about	Issue Date	Signature of Pilot in Command	Page 1 of 1
Whiteman AFB, MO	13-212	304FS	20130522	20130522		

GONOGO VERIFICATION I certify gonogo checks were accomplished for aircrew members listed below. As a minimum flight physical, physical availability, physiological training, emergency egress, local area survival, current ASC (AO effective date/term date), ACFT AOG, FCIF card and any other grounding events were checked. Individuals non-current for aircrew training or aircrew qualification have appropriate remarks codes assigned and an instructor is onboard for their crew specialty. Variations in library authorized.

100X2 Initials [Redacted] **Ops Officer Review:** [Signature]

Signature of aircraft commander below acknowledges gonogo checks were accomplished

Line #	Name	Rank	Crew Pos	Duty Pos	Sec Cir	MOS	Man Sym	Call Sgn	Tail Nbr	Remarks Code	EIA	ATA	Sorte Duration	Signature of Pilot in Command	Initials for Changes
1	--Schneiter, John M	Major	MP	MP	1	AO10C	T3			21	1500				
2	Margam, Shai E	Major	IP	IP	1/D	AO10C	T3			21	1500				
3	--Marks, John P	Lt Col	EP	MP		AO10C	T3			21	1510				
4	McConnell, Preston J	Lt Col	EP	MP		AO10C	T3			21	1510				
5	--Riddle, Todd D	Major	IP	MP		AO10C	T3			21	1530				
6	--Plakits, Scott W	Major	IP	MP		AO10C	T3			21	1550				
7	Carlton, Chad A	Major	IP	MP		AO10C	T3			21	1550				
8	--Kos, Anthony L	Lt Col	EP	MP		AO10C	T3			21	1900				
9	Decker, Nicholas C	Capt	MP	MP		AO10C	T3			21	1900				
10	--Duckworth, Allen	Lt Col	IP	MP		AO10C	T3			21	1940				
11	Murphy, Patrick F	Lt Col	IP	MP		AO10C	T3			21	1940				
12	Bohler, Kevin M	Major	IP	MP		AO10C	T3			21	2000				
13	--Leomas, Michael D	Lt Col	EP	MP		AO10C	T3			21	2000				
14	GS-13					AO10C	T3			21	2110				

AF IMT 4327, 20031101 (V1)

AF IMT 4327, 20031101 (REVERSE)(V1)

K1.2. PEX FLYING SCHEDULE

[illegible]

INTENTIONALLY

LEFT

BLANK

K1.3. NOTAMS

Defense Internet NOTAM Service

Page 1 of 8

Sort By: Default Report

Keyword Sort:


Locations:

KSZL, KTBN, KSGF, KCOU, KMCI, KFOE, KSTJ, KSLN, KIAB, KFSM, ATTA, ATTN, KMHK

Data Current as of: Wed 22 May 2013 12:46:00 GMT

KSZL WHITEMAN AFB

Data Current as of: Wed, 22 May 2013 12:46:00 GMT



Effective 2 MAY 2013 thru 29 MAY 2013

- M0550/13 - MANDATORY INST HOLD SIGN LIGHT OTS AT TAXIWAY ALPHA. 22 MAY 05:05 2013 UNTIL 15 JUN 23:59 2013. CREATED: 22 MAY 05:07 2013
- M0549/13 - RUNWAY 19 APPROACH LIGHTING SYSTEM (ALSF-1) UNSERVICEABLE. 21 MAY 19:54 2013 UNTIL 21 JUN 23:59 2013. CREATED: 21 MAY 19:58 2013
- M0547/13 - TAXILANE ECHO AND FOXTROT NORTHWEST/SOUTHEAST TRANSITION POINT CLOSED. 21 MAY 20:00 2013 UNTIL 18 JUN 23:59 2013. CREATED: 21 MAY 19:50 2013
- M0546/13 - APPROACH CONTROL CLOSED. 24 MAY 04:00 2013 UNTIL 28 MAY 12:00 2013. CREATED: 21 MAY 17:12 2013
- M0544/13 - AERODROME CLOSED. 24 MAY 04:00 2013 UNTIL 28 MAY 12:00 2013. CREATED: 21 MAY

<https://www.notams.jcs.mil/dinsQueryWeb/queryRetrievalMapAction.do>

5/22/2013

16:16 2013

M0541/13 - RUNWAY 01 THRESHOLD ELEVATION IS 838' VERSUS 837' AS DEPICTED IN LOW ALTITUDE UNITED STATES VOLUME 13, ILS OR LOC/DME RUNWAY 01, TACAN RUNWAY 01, RNAV (GPS) RUNWAY 01. 21 MAY 14:04 2013 UNTIL 18 JUN 23:59 2013. CREATED: 21 MAY 14:07 2013

M0540/13 - RUNWAY 01 THRESHOLD ELEVATION IS 838' VERSUS 837' AS DEPICTED IN HIGH ALTITUDE UNITED STATES VOLUME 13, ILS OR LOC/DME RUNWAY 01, H1-TACAN RUNWAY 01. 21 MAY 13:53 2013 UNTIL 18 AUG 23:59 2013. CREATED: 21 MAY 14:00 2013

M0365/13 - WHITEMAN CONTROL TOWER FREQUENCY CHANGED FROM 255.6 TO NOW READ 318.8. 31 MAR 04:59 2013 UNTIL 24 JUN 23:59 2013. CREATED: 28 MAR 21:38 2013

M0300/13 - WHITEMAN RADAR DERIVED WEATHER UNRELIABLE UNTIL FURTHER NOTICE. 21 MAR 11:26 2013 UNTIL 18 JUN 23:59 2013. CREATED: 21 MAR 11:28 2013

M0185/13 - BIRD RADAR OBSTACLE LIGHTS UNSERVICEABLE. 02 MAR 12:28 2013 UNTIL 25 MAY 23:59 2013. CREATED: 02 MAR 12:31 2013

V0117/13 - [DOD PROCEDURAL NOTAM] INSTRUMENT APPROACH PROCEDURE CHANGED RNAV (GPS) RWY 01 & RNAV (GPS) RWY 19 CIRCLING CAT D 1460-2 590 (600-2). 25 MAR 12:44 2013 UNTIL 19 JUN 00:01 2013. CREATED: 25 MAR 12:47 2013

L0016/13 - SOUTH HAMMERHEAD DIMENSIONS ARE 300' BY 280'. 21 MAY 18:37 2013 UNTIL 18 AUG 23:59 2013. CREATED: 21 MAY 18:36 2013

L0015/13 - AIRPORT DIAGRAM DOES NOT DEPICT REMOVAL OF CLOSED AIRFIELD SURFACES NORTH OF TAXIWAY CHARLIE ON EAST SIDE OF RUNWAY 01/19. 21 MAY 14:54 2013 UNTIL 18 JUN 23:59 2013. CREATED: 21 MAY 14:55 2013

L0014/13 - AIRPORT DIAGRAM DOES NOT DEPICT B-2 IMAGING CIRCLE ALONG WESTERN BORDER OF TAXILANE FOXTROT AND EAST OF FIRE DEPARTMENT. 21 MAY 14:44 2013 UNTIL 18 JUN 23:59 2013. CREATED: 21 MAY 14:46 2013

L0013/13 - AIRPORT DIAGRAM DOES NOT DEPICT DISTINGUISHED VISITOR RED CARPET PARKING IMMEDIATELY EAST OF BASE OPERATIONS. 21 MAY 14:23 2013 UNTIL 18 JUN 23:59 2013. CREATED: 21 MAY 14:31 2013

L0012/13 - AIRPORT DIAGRAM DEPICTS TAXIWAY ECHO AND TAXIWAY FOXTROT INSTEAD OF TAXILANE ECHO AND TAXILANE FOXTROT. 21 MAY 14:21 2013 UNTIL 18 JUN 23:59 2013. CREATED: 21 MAY 14:22 2013

L0011/13 - AIRPORT DIAGRAM DOES NOT DEPICT TAXILANE JULIET ALONG EAST SIDE OF NORTH RAMP AND TAXILANE KILO ALONG WEST SIDE OF APRON. 21 MAY 14:14 2013 UNTIL 18 JUN 23:59 2013. CREATED: 21 MAY 14:20 2013

L0010/13 - NORTH RAMP AIRCRAFT OPERATIONS ARE RESTRICTED TO HOME-STATION ASSIGNED AIRCRAFT. 21 MAY 14:13 2013 UNTIL 18 JUN 23:59 2013. CREATED: 21 MAY 14:13 2013

L0006/13 - NORTH HAMMERHEAD DIMENSIONS ARE 500' BY 280'. 21 MAY 12:10 2013 UNTIL 18 AUG 23:59 2013. CREATED: 21 MAY 12:14 2013

L0005/13 - TAXIWAY GOLF AND CONNECTING APRON ARE RESTRICTED TO HELICOPTER OPERATIONS ONLY. 21 MAY 12:06 2013 UNTIL 18 AUG 23:59 2013. CREATED: 21 MAY 12:09 2013

KTBN WAYNESVILLE-ST. ROBERT RGNL FORNEY FLD

05/007 - OBST TOWER 1591 (330 AGL) 15.1 SSW LGTS OTS (ASR 1278432). WIE UNTIL 04 JUN 01:47 2013. CREATED: 20 MAY 01:48 2013

05/006 - OBST TOWER 1209 (245 AGL) 5.6 NW LGTS OTS (ASR 1253568). WIE UNTIL 31 MAY 02:27 2013. CREATED: 16 MAY 02:28 2013

05/004 - OBST TOWER 1373 (213 AGL) 13.97 SSW LGTS OTS (ASR 1006063). WIE UNTIL 28 MAY 21:05 2013. CREATED: 13 MAY 21:05 2013

05/003 - OBST TOWER 1657 (253 AGL) 13.23 S LGTS OTS (ASR 1006061). WIE UNTIL 28 MAY 21:05 2013. CREATED: 13 MAY 21:05 2013

09/004 - NAV ILS RWY 14 DME U/S. WIE UNTIL UFN. CREATED: 20 SEP 21:12 2012

FDC 3/6697 - FI/T IAP WAYNESVILLE-ST. ROBERT RGNL FORNEY FLD, FORT LEONARD WOOD, MO.

ILS OR LOC RWY 14, AMDT 1...

WOKVI FIX MINIMUMS NA, I-TBN DME OTS. FLIGHT INSPECTION REQUIRED. WIE UNTIL UFN. CREATED: 02 MAY 19:31 2013

FDC 2/3115 - FI/T IAP WAYNESVILLE-ST. ROBERT RGNL FORNEY FLD, FORT LEONARD WOOD, MO.

NDB/DME RWY 14, AMDT 1B...

PROC NA, EXCEPT FOR AIRCRAFT EQUIPPED WITH SUITABLE RNAV SYSTEM WITH GPS, I-TBN DME OTS. WIE UNTIL UFN. CREATED: 04 OCT 22:05 2012

KSGF SPRINGFIELD-BRANSON NATIONAL

05/028 (A0304/13) - RWY 2/20 CLSD. 23 MAY 12:30 2013 UNTIL 23 MAY 20:30 2013. CREATED: 22 MAY 12:32 2013

05/027 (A0302/13) - NAV ILS RWY 2 U/S. 22 MAY 12:30 2013 UNTIL 22 MAY 21:00 2013. CREATED: 21 MAY 20:17 2013

05/019 - OBST TOWER 1884 (620 AGL) 8.3 SW LGTS OTS (ASR 1223023). WIE UNTIL 31 MAY 19:39 2013. CREATED: 16 MAY 19:39 2013

05/018 - OBST TOWER 1756 (620 AGL) 8.9 NW LGTS OTS (ASR 1222858). WIE UNTIL 31 MAY 19:37 2013. CREATED: 16 MAY 19:38 2013

03/071 (A0213/13) - TWY J CLSD AT NIGHT. 27 MAR 18:35 2013 UNTIL UFN. CREATED: 27 MAR 18:39 2013

FDC 3/9336 (A0224/13) - FI/T IAP SPRINGFIELD-BRANSON NATIONAL, SPRINGFIELD, MO.

RNAV (GPS) RWY 14, AMDT 2...

LPV DA 1517/HATH 257.

CIRCLING CAT D MDA 1920/HAA 652. WIE UNTIL UFN. CREATED: 03 APR 19:48 2013

FDC 3/9335 (A0223/13) - FI/T IAP SPRINGFIELD-BRANSON NATIONAL, SPRINGFIELD, MO.

ILS OR LOC RWY 14, ORIG-A...

S-ILS 14 DA 1517/HAT 257 ALL CATS, VISIBILITY 3/4 ALL CATS.

S-LOC 14 HAT 360 ALL CATS, VISIBILITY 3/4 ALL CATS.

CIRCLING MDA CAT D 1920/HAA 652

TDZE 1260

HELICOPTER VISIBILITY REDUCTION BELOW 3/4 SM NOT AUTHORIZED.

INOPERATIVE TABLE DOES NOT APPLY TO S-ILS 14.

FOR INOPERATIVE MALSR, INCREASE S-LOC 14 VISIBILITY CAT A/B/C

TO 1.

MSA FROM SGF VORTAC 070-220 4600, 220-070 3100. WIE UNTIL UFN. CREATED: 03 APR 19:47 2013

FDC 3/8618 (A0220/13) - FI/T IAP SPRINGFIELD-BRANSON NATIONAL, SPRINGFIELD, MO.

VOR/DME OR TACAN RWY 2, ORIG-B...

VOR OR TACAN RWY 20, AMDT 18 C...

PROCEDURE NA. WIE UNTIL UFN. CREATED: 30 MAR 20:00 2013

FDC 3/8272 (A0217/13) - FI/T IAP SPRINGFIELD-BRANSON NATIONAL, SPRINGFIELD, MO.

ILS OR LOC RWY 2, AMDT 18...

ILS OR LOC RWY 14, ORIG-A...

RNAV (GPS) RWY 2, AMDT 2...

RNAV (GPS) RWY 14, AMDT 2...

RNAV (GPS) RWY 20, AMDT 2...

VOR/DME OR TACAN RWY 2, ORIG-B...

VOR OR TACAN RWY 20, AMDT 18C...

CIRCLING TO RWY 32 NA AT NIGHT. WIE UNTIL UFN. CREATED: 28 MAR 19:34 2013

FDC 3/8271 (A0216/13) - FI/T IAP SPRINGFIELD-BRANSON NATIONAL, SPRINGFIELD, MO.

RNAV (GPS) RWY 32, AMDT 1A...

RWY 32 STRAIGHT-IN AND CIRCLING NA AT NIGHT. WIE UNTIL UFN. CREATED: 28 MAR 19:34 2013

FDC 3/8270 (A0215/13) - FI/T IAP SPRINGFIELD-BRANSON NATIONAL, SPRINGFIELD, MO.

HI TACAN RWY 20, AMDT 1...

CIRCLING TO RWY 32 NA AT NIGHT. WIE UNTIL UFN. CREATED: 28 MAR 19:34 2013

KCOU COLUMBIA RGNL

05/309 - TWY B HOLD SIGN AT RWY 2/20 LGTS U/S. WIE UNTIL UFN. CREATED: 22 MAY 02:28 2013

05/308 - TWY A HOLD SIGN AT RWY 13/31 LGTS OTS-. WIE UNTIL UFN. CREATED: 22 MAY 02:28 2013

05/307 - RWY 13/31 HOLD SIGN AT 2/20 LGTS U/S. WIE UNTIL UFN. CREATED: 22 MAY 02:27 2013

05/306 - RWY 2/20 HOLD SIGN AT RWY 13/31 LGTS U/S. WIE UNTIL UFN. CREATED: 22 MAY 02:26 2013

05/300 - RWY 2 RVR U/S. 21 MAY 21:51 2013 UNTIL UFN. CREATED: 21 MAY 21:51 2013

04/296 - SVC REMOTE AIRPORT ADVISORY SERVICE NOT AVBL. WIE UNTIL UFN. CREATED: 25 APR 03:11 2013

04/260 - TWY A5 CLSD. WIE UNTIL UFN. CREATED: 22 APR 11:44 2013
 04/140 - TWY A CLSD BTN TWY A5 AND TWY D. WIE UNTIL UFN. CREATED: 11 APR 22:08 2013
 04/023 - TWY A4 CLSD. WIE UNTIL UFN. CREATED: 03 APR 14:33 2013
 04/022 - TWY A3 CLSD. WIE UNTIL UFN. CREATED: 03 APR 14:33 2013
 03/177 - TWY A2 CLSD. WIE UNTIL UFN. CREATED: 16 MAR 00:32 2013
 03/133 - TWY B2 CLSD. WIE UNTIL UFN. CREATED: 11 MAR 19:32 2013
FDC 3/6078 - FI/T IAP COLUMBIA RGNL, COLUMBIA, MO.
 ILS OR LOC/DME RWY 2, AMDT 14...
 S-ILS 2 AND S-LOC 2 ALL CATS VISIBILITY 1 MILE.
 WHEN LOCAL ALTIMETER SETTING NOT RECEIVED, USE JEFFERSON CITY
 ALTIMETER SETTING AND INCREASE ALL DA/MDA 80 FEET.
 NOTE NA *RVR 1800 AUTHORIZED WITH THE USE OF FD OR AP OR HUD TO
 DA, NOTE NA. WIE UNTIL UFN. CREATED: 01 MAY 20:32 2013
FDC 3/6076 - FI/T IAP COLUMBIA RGNL, COLUMBIA, MO.
 VOR RWY 20, AMDT 4...
 S-20 CAT A/B VISIBILITY 1 MILE. WIE UNTIL UFN. CREATED: 01 MAY 20:32 2013
FDC 3/6075 - FI/T IAP COLUMBIA RGNL, COLUMBIA, MO.
 LOC/DME BC RWY 20, AMDT 12...
 S-20 CAT A/B/C VISIBILITY 1 MILE.
 WHEN LOCAL ALTIMETER SETTING NOT RECEIVED, USE JEFFERSON CITY
 ALTIMETER SETTING AND INCREASE ALL MDA 80 FEET AND INCREASE
 VISIBILITY S-20 CAT C/D 1/4 MILE. WIE UNTIL UFN. CREATED: 01 MAY 20:32
 2013
FDC 3/6074 - FI/T IAP COLUMBIA RGNL, COLUMBIA, MO.
 VOR/DME RWY 20, AMDT 3...
 S-20 CAT A/B/C VISIBILITY 1 MILE. WIE UNTIL UFN. CREATED: 01 MAY 20:32
 2013
FDC 3/6073 - FI/T IAP COLUMBIA RGNL, COLUMBIA, MO.
 RNAV (GPS) RWY 20, AMDT 1...
 LNAV/VNAV DA AND LNAV MDA CATS A/B/C VISIBILITY 1 MILE. WIE UNTIL UFN.
 CREATED: 01 MAY 20:32 2013
FDC 3/6072 - FI/T IAP COLUMBIA RGNL, COLUMBIA, MO.
 RNAV (GPS) RWY 2, AMDT 1...
 LPV DA AND LNAV/VNAV DA ALL CATS AND LNAV MDA CATS A/B/C
 VISIBILITY TO RVR 6000.
 NOTE NA FOR INOPERATIVE MALSR NOTE NA. WIE UNTIL UFN. CREATED: 01 MAY 20:32
 2013

KMCI KANSAS CITY INTL

W0223/13 - [DOD PROCEDURAL NOTAM] INSTRUMENT APPROACH PROCEDURE NOT
 AUTHORIZED:
 ILS RWY 19R (CAT II & III) PUBLISHED IN DOD VOL 13. AIRCREW MAY
 UTILIZE THE ILS RWY 19R (CAT II & III) AMDT 4 FOUND ON THE FAA WEB
 SITE AT
[HTTP://AVN.FAA.GOV/CONTENT/AERONAV/SAFETY_ALERTS/SA_TCP-13-04_TPP.PDF](http://AVN.FAA.GOV/CONTENT/AERONAV/SAFETY_ALERTS/SA_TCP-13-04_TPP.PDF). 02 MAY
 09:01 2013 UNTIL 30 MAY 09:01 2013. CREATED: 30 APR 11:49 2013
05/116 (A1749/13) - RWY 1L/19R CLSD. 22 MAY 13:00 2013 UNTIL 22 MAY 20:00 2013. CREATED: 22 MAY 12:02
 2013
03/253 (A1380/13) - NAV ILS RWY 1L MM DCMSN. WIE UNTIL UFN. CREATED: 27 MAR 21:00 2013
11/002 (A1855/12) - TOP NAV TACAN AZM U/S. 04 NOV 00:42 2012 UNTIL UFN. CREATED: 04 NOV 00:42 2012
FDC 3/0593 (A1732/13) - FI/T IAP KANSAS CITY INTL, KANSAS CITY, MO.
 ILS OR LOC RWY 9, AMDT 14...
 ALTERNATE MINIMUMS NA, TOP VORTAC UNMONITORED. WIE UNTIL UFN. CREATED:
 20 MAY 02:09 2013
FDC 3/6205 (A1573/13) - FI/P CHART KANSAS CITY INTL, KANSAS CITY, MO,
 ILS RWY 19R (CAT II & III), AMDT 4...
 ILS RWY 1R (CAT II & III), AMDT, 10B...
 CORRECT U.S. TERMINAL PROCEDURES PUBLICATION NORTH CENTRAL (NC)
 VOL 3 OF 3. CHARTS ARE INCORRECT ON PAGES 326 AND 327.
 CORRECT COPIES OF THESE CHARTS CAN BE FOUND AT:
[HTTP://AERONAV.FAA.GOV/CONTENT/AERONAV/SAFETY_ALERTS/SA_TCP-13-04_TPP.PDF](http://AERONAV.FAA.GOV/CONTENT/AERONAV/SAFETY_ALERTS/SA_TCP-13-04_TPP.PDF). WIE
 UNTIL UFN. CREATED: 02 MAY 10:47 2013
FDC 2/2705 (A1707/12) - FI/T STAR KANSAS CITY INTERNATIONAL ROBINSON THREE
 ARRIVAL ... RBA VOR/DME TO JUDAA INT, MEA 5000. WIE UNTIL UFN. CREATED: 04 OCT
 14:06 2012

FDC 1/7838 (A2808/11) - KANSAS CITY INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT
 AUTOMATIC DEPENDENT SURVEILLANCE, ESSENTIAL SERVICE BROADCAST.
 EFFECTIVE NOVEMBER 30, 2011. THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION
 (FAA) HAS ADOPTED TWO ADS-B DATA LINKS: 1090 MHZ EXTENDED SQUITTER
 (1090ES) AND 978 MHZ UNIVERSAL ACCESS TRANSCEIVER (UAT). THE TWO
 LINKS OPERATE SIMILARLY AND SUPPORT TRAFFIC INFORMATION
 SERVICE-BROADCAST (TIS-B). ADDITIONALLY, THE UAT LINK SUPPORTS FLIGHT
 INFORMATION SERVICE- BROADCAST (FIS-B). TIS-B SERVICE WILL BE
 AVAILABLE THROUGHOUT THE NATIONAL AIRSPACE SYSTEM (NAS) WHERE THERE
 ARE BOTH ADEQUATE SURVEILLANCE COVERAGE (RADAR) AND ADEQUATE
 BROADCAST COVERAGE FROM ADS-B GROUND STATIONS. FIS-B SERVICE
 AVAILABILITY IS EXPECTED THROUGHOUT THE NAS IN 2013, AND IS CURRENTLY
 AVAILABLE WITHIN CERTAIN REGIONS. THIS NOTAM ANNOUNCES THE
 AVAILABILITY OF THE INITIAL TIS-B AND FIS-B CAPABILITY WITH THE
 KANSAS CITY INTL MCI AIRPORT AIRSPACE. THE FAA IS DEVELOPING POLICY
 GUIDANCE MATERIAL ON AUTOMATIC DEPENDENT SURVEILLANCE-BROADCAST
 (ADS-B), ESSENTIAL SERVICES TIS-B AND FIS-B THAT WILL BE PUBLISHED IN
 TRADITIONAL SOURCE REFERENCES SUCH AS THE AERONAUTICAL INFORMATION
 MANUAL (AIM). REPORTS OF TIS-B AND FIS-B MALFUNCTIONS SHOULD BE
 REPORTED BY RADIO OR TELEPHONE TO THE NEAREST FLIGHT SERVICE STATION
 (FSS) FACILITY. WIE UNTIL UFN. CREATED: 28 NOV 22:38 2011

KFOE FORBES FIELD

05/009 (A0446/13) - TWY B BTN RWY 13/31 AND RWY 03/21
 E SIDE TWY LGTS U/S. WIE UNTIL UFN. CREATED: 22 MAY 03:08 2013

05/008 (A0445/13) - RWY 31 RVR U/S. 22 MAY 14:00 2013 UNTIL 22 MAY 19:00 2013. CREATED: 21 MAY 19:53 2013

02/001 - OBST TOWER 1949 (899 AGL) 10.3 SE LGTS OTS
 (ASR 1033563). 04 FEB 16:31 2013 UNTIL 31 DEC 16:30 2013. CREATED: 04 FEB 16:31 2013

A0425/13 - OPICH VOR/DME OR TACAN RWY 3, AMDT 6...
 PROCEDURE NA EXCEPT FOR AIRCRAFT EQUIPPED WITH SUITABLE RNAV
 SYSTEM WITH GPS, EMP TACAN U/S. WIE UNTIL UFN. CREATED: 29 APR 15:39 2013

FDC 3/0595 (A0437/13) - FI/T IAP FORBES FIELD, TOPEKA, KS.
 ILS OR LOC RWY 31, AMDT 9E...
 VOR/DME OR TACAN RWY 3, AMDT 6...
 VOR/DME OR TACAN RWY 21, AMDT 7...
 NDB RWY 13, AMDT 7...
 ALTERNATE MINIMUMS NA, TOP VORTAC UNMONITORED. WIE UNTIL UFN. CREATED:
 20 MAY 02:10 2013

L0001/13 - KSANG APRON HAS NONSTD FLUORESCENT ORANGE MARKINGS LOCATED ON ROW
 4. MARKINGS ARE FOR UNDERGROUND UTILITIES IDENTIFICATION. 09 MAY 19:00 2013
 UNTIL 31 MAY 21:00 2013. CREATED: 09 MAY 18:53 2013

KSTJ ROSECRANS MEMORIAL

05/026 - OBST TOWER 1226 (259 AGL) 3.5 ESE LGTS OTS (ASR 1006991). WIE UNTIL 04 JUN 02:00 2013. CREATED: 20 MAY 02:01 2013

05/025 - OBST TOWER 1312 (350 AGL) 14.5 NE LGTS OTS (ASR 1248259). 20 MAY 01:56 2013 UNTIL 04 JUN 00:56 2013. CREATED: 20 MAY 01:55 2013

05/022 - OBST TOWER 1363 (210 AGL) 8.7 W LGTS OTS (ASR 1232231). 19 MAY 05:30 2013 UNTIL 03 JUN 05:30 2013. CREATED: 19 MAY 05:30 2013

05/017 - OBST TOWER 1574 (495 AGL) 8.1 SE LGTS OTS
 (ASR 1006728). WIE UNTIL 30 MAY 01:58 2013. CREATED: 15 MAY 01:58 2013

05/016 - SVC TERMINAL AREA RADAR U/S. WIE UNTIL UFN. CREATED: 14 MAY 13:35 2013

05/013 - OBST TOWER 1482 (280 AGL) 6.9 WNW LGTS OTS (ASR 1046390). WIE UNTIL 27 MAY 01:17 2013. CREATED: 12 MAY 01:18 2013

04/016 - TWY ALL TWY LGTS MED INTST CONT 0100-1200 WKDAYS. WIE UNTIL UFN. CREATED: 14 APR 21:37 2012

04/015 - RWY 17/35 PCL OTS EXC MED INTST CONT 0100-1200 WKDAYS. WIE UNTIL UFN. CREATED: 14 APR 21:37 2012

04/014 - TWY ALL TWY LGTS MED INTST CONT 0000-1300 WKEND. WIE UNTIL UFN. CREATED: 14 APR 21:37 2012

04/013 - RWY 17/35 PCL OTS EXC MED INTST CONT 0000-1300 WKEND. WIE UNTIL UFN. CREATED: 14 APR 21:37 2012

M0226/13 - MEN AND EQUIPMENT 250FT EAST RUNWAY 01R/19L EDGE MIDFIELD. 30 APR 13:46 2013 UNTIL 06 JUN 23:59 2013. CREATED: 30 APR 13:46 2013

M0187/13 - TAXIWAY ALPHA FROM PARKING SPOT BRAVO 14 TO BUILDING 1218 CLOSED DUE TO CONSTRUCTION. 22 APR 07:00 2013 UNTIL 06 JUN 23:59 2013. CREATED: 19 APR 21:00 2013

L0097/13 - PARKING SPOT ALPHA 13 IS TOW ON/TOW OFF ONLY. 21 MAY 15:12 2013 UNTIL 10 AUG 23:59 2013. CREATED: 21 MAY 15:13 2013

L0096/13 - MASS AREA PARKING CLSD STARTING FROM SPOTS BRAVO14 THROUGH OPERATIONS RAMP DUE TO CONSTRUCTION. 21 MAY 15:10 2013 UNTIL 10 AUG 23:59 2013. CREATED: 21 MAY 15:11 2013

L0087/13 - TAXIWAY CHARLIE MANDATORY SIGN OUT ON EAST SIDE OF RWY 01R/19L. 01 MAY 00:57 2013 UNTIL 06 JUN 23:59 2013. CREATED: 01 MAY 00:58 2013

L0086/13 - TWY CHARLIE CLOSED WEST OF RWY 01R/19L. 01 MAY 00:55 2013 UNTIL 06 JUN 23:59 2013. CREATED: 01 MAY 00:55 2013

L0084/13 - TWY LIGHTS FOR TWY CHARLIE UNAVAILABLE DUE TO CONSTRUCTION. 01 MAY 00:46 2013 UNTIL 06 JUN 23:59 2013. CREATED: 01 MAY 00:46 2013

L0082/13 - TAXIWAY FOXTROT CLOSED. 29 APR 21:07 2013 UNTIL 06 JUN 23:59 2013. CREATED: 29 APR 21:08 2013

L0060/13 - TWY BRAVO WEST OF RWY 01R/19L IS CLOSED. 08 APR 17:42 2013 UNTIL 30 MAY 23:59 2013. CREATED: 08 APR 17:44 2013

L0055/13 - US CUSTOMS ONLY AVAILABLE MONDAY-FRIDAY 1300Z-2130Z. 25 MAR 15:32 2013 UNTIL 21 JUN 23:59 2013. CREATED: 25 MAR 15:33 2013

L0049/13 - TAXIWAY ECHO CLOSED WEST OF RUNWAY 19L/01R. 04 MAR 17:46 2013 UNTIL 01 JUN 23:59 2013. CREATED: 04 MAR 17:47 2013

KFSM FORT SMITH RGNL

05/027 - NAV JEMBO NDB/ILS RWY 7 LO U/S. 23 MAY 13:00 2013 UNTIL 23 MAY 16:00 2013. CREATED: 22 MAY 11:18 2013

05/025 - OBST TOWER 765 (275 AGL) 3.4 E LGTS OTS (ASR 1206512). 21 MAY 03:20 2013 UNTIL 05 JUN 02:20 2013. CREATED: 21 MAY 03:19 2013

05/023 - OBST TOWER 714 (270 AGL) 9.0 E LGTS OTS (ASR 1236109). WIE UNTIL 04 JUN 18:55 2013. CREATED: 20 MAY 18:56 2013

05/021 - SVC MICROBURST/WINDSHEAR DETECTION SYSTEM U/S. 23 MAY 13:00 2013 UNTIL 23 MAY 19:00 2013. CREATED: 20 MAY 13:00 2013

05/020 - OBST TOWER 759 (325 AGL) 7.3 NNE LGTS OTS (ASR 1061892). 20 MAY 07:25 2013 UNTIL 04 JUN 06:25 2013. CREATED: 20 MAY 07:25 2013

05/019 - OBST TOWER 1049 (274 AGL) 8.1 S LGTS OTS (ASR 1241324). WIE UNTIL 02 JUN 07:07 2013. CREATED: 18 MAY 07:08 2013

05/008 - OBST TOWER 1228 (320 AGL) 12.4 SSE LGTS OTS (ASR 1028975). WIE UNTIL 25 MAY 11:38 2013. CREATED: 10 MAY 11:39 2013

05/007 - OBST TOWER 624 (154 AGL) 2.2 W LGTS OTS (ASR 1233072). WIE UNTIL 25 MAY 10:30 2013. CREATED: 10 MAY 10:30 2013

09/018 - OBST TOWER UNKN (210 AGL) 4.1 NW (3523N09425W) LGTS U/S. WIE UNTIL UFN. CREATED: 10 SEP 21:49 2012

10/003 - OBST TOWER UKN (220 AGL) 2.87 NE UNLGTD (3521N/09419W). WIE UNTIL UFN. CREATED: 03 OCT 21:57 2011

10/002 - OBST TOWER UNK (220 AGL) 2.73 NE (3522N/09419). WIE UNTIL UFN. CREATED: 03 OCT 21:57 2011

FDC 3/8557 (A0001/13) - AIRSPACE ADS-B SERVICES TISB AND FISB AVBL MAY10, 2013. TIS-B SERVICE IS AVAILABLE THROUGHOUT THE NAS WHERE THERE ARE BOTH ADEQUATE SURVEILLANCE COVERAGE (RADAR) AND BROADCAST COVERAGE FROM ADS-B GROUND STATIONS. REPORTS OF TIS-B AND FIS-B MALFUNCTIONS SHOULD BE REPORTED BY RADIO OR TELEPHONE TO THE NEAREST FSS FACILITY. WIE UNTIL UFN. CREATED: 10 MAY 16:54 2013

ATTA ATTENTION ALL REGIONS**ATTN ATTENTION NORTH AMERICAN REGION**

M0084/13 (Issued for KGCS ATTN) - AIR/GROUND FACILITY UNSERVICEABLE/ANDREWS IS DEGRADED/FOR FURTHER QUESTIONS PLEASE CONTACT THE ANCS VIA SECURE MEANS, DSN:

312-858-9747//. UNSCHEDULED OUTAGE//, 22 MAY 03:58 2013 UNTIL 22 MAY 15:58 2013.
 CREATED: 22 MAY 03:59 2013

KMHK MANHATTAN RGNL

05/020 - OBST TOWER 1241 (100 AGL) 2.43 SW LGTS OTS (ASR UNKN). WIE UNTIL 04 JUN 13:20 2013. CREATED: 20 MAY 13:21 2013

05/018 - OBST TOWER 1906 (490 AGL) 17.4 NE LGTS OTS (ASR 1002484). WIE UNTIL 03 JUN 04:26 2013. CREATED: 19 MAY 04:26 2013

05/016 - RWY 3 ALS MED INTST U/S. 17 MAY 18:34 2013 UNTIL UFN. CREATED: 17 MAY 18:34 2013

05/004 - APRON TERMINAL APRON LGTD BARRICADES WEST EDGE. 06 MAY 21:06 2013 UNTIL 30 SEP 22:00 2013. CREATED: 06 MAY 21:19 2013

05/003 - TWY A CLSD BTN TWY D AND 800 N OF TWY C. 06 MAY 21:00 2013 UNTIL 30 SEP 22:00 2013. CREATED: 06 MAY 21:04 2013

04/016 - TWY D,E SURFACE PAINTED HOLDING POSITION SIGNS AT RUNWAY 3/21 NONSTD. WIE UNTIL UFN. CREATED: 30 APR 23:39 2013

04/006 - AIRSPACE SEE ZKC 04/149 UNMANNED ACFT 1400-2300 DLY. 15 APR 14:00 2013 UNTIL 15 JUL 23:00 2013. CREATED: 12 APR 15:40 2013

FDC 3/5378 - FI/T ODP MANHATTAN RGNL, MANHATTAN, KS.
 TAKEOFF MINIMUMS AND (OBSTACLE) DEPARTURE PROCEDURES AMDT 7A...
 NOTE: RWY 13, TEMPORARY CRANE, 937 FEET FROM DEPARTURE END OF
 RWY, 372 RIGHT OF CENTERLINE, 80 FEET AGL/ 1124 FEET MSL.
 ALL OTHER DATA REMAINS AS PUBLISHED. WIE UNTIL UFN. CREATED: 30 APR 13:09 2013

FDC 3/5377 - FI/T SID MANHATTAN RGNL, MANHATTAN, KS.
 WILSY (RNAV) ONE DEPARTURE...
 NOTE: RWY 13, TEMPORARY CRANE, 937 FEET FROM DEPARTURE END
 OF RWY, 372 RIGHT OF CENTERLINE, 80 FEET AGL/ 1124 FEET MSL.
 ALL OTHER DATA REMAINS AS PUBLISHED. WIE UNTIL UFN. CREATED: 30 APR 13:09 2013

FDC 3/3414 - FI/P IAP MANHATTAN RGNL, MANHATTAN, KS.
 ILS OR LOC/DME RWY 3, AMDT 7...
 ALTERNATE MINIMUMS: DELETE "NA WHEN CONTROL TOWER CLOSED"
 CHANGE NOTE TO READ: HELICOPTER VISIBILITY REDUCTION BELOW 3/4
 SM NOT AUTHORIZED.
 CHART NOTE: INOPERATIVE TABLE DOES NOT APPLY TO S-ILS 3.
 THIS IS ILS OR LOC/DME RWY 3, AMDT 7A. WIE UNTIL UFN. CREATED: 19 APR 15:33 2013

K1.4. DEUCE 01 RISK MANAGEMENT WORKSHEET**303d FS Risk Management Worksheet**

(As of 30 Jan 2011)

Callsign: *DEUCE 01*SOF Initials: *AN*Date: *22 MAY 2013*Approving Officials Initials:
(If required)**Sortie Type: (circle only one)**

ACM	6
FAC(A)	6
BFM	5
BSA	5
CAS	7
FCF	5
INST	3
CSAR (Full-Up)	10
CSAR (Part Task)	5
SAT	<u>6</u>

Other Sortie Types: (circle all that apply)

Syllabus Sortie	3
Exercise Sortie	2
IQT	4
Escort	3
Non-Demanding	4
Deployed Ops	2
3 or 4 Ship	2
Checkride	2
Over 4-Ship	3
Dissimilar Assets	3

Weather: (circle all that apply)

WX	
>5000/5	N/A
3000-5000/3	<u>1</u>
1500-3000/3	2
500-1500/1.5	3
<500/1.5	4
Temp	
<32 F	1
85-100 F	2
>100 F	3
Wind	
>25 Kts	2

Night: (circle all that apply)

Low Illumination Level	2
NVG Basic	1
Non-NVG	2
NVG Tactical	3
Night AAR	2

Planned Low Alt Operations: (circle one)

Cat I (500')	N/A
Cat II (300-500')	<u>2</u>
Cat III (100-300')	4

Range / Weapons: (circle all that apply)

Heavyweight / Inert	2
Live Heavyweights	4
Unfamiliar Range	2

Miscellaneous: (circle all that apply)

14+days since flying	2
Attached Flyer	2
Mission change (brief <1 hr)	2
Bird Condition Mod+	2
N-CMR probation	1
N-CMR	2
Chem-Gear Flt	12

TOTAL: 9**Approval Authority:**

0-15	SOF
16-25	CC/DO
26-30	OG/CC or DOG
31+	WG/CC

INTENTIONALLY

LEFT

BLANK

K1.5. AHAS RISK ASSESSMENT

Avian Hazard Advisory System

Page 1 of 4

[Click here to Print]

**AHAS RISK FOR 442ndFW**

WHITEMAN AFB					
SEGMENT	Date/Time	NEARAD	AHAS RISK	BASED ON	HEIGHT (100ft AGL)
WHITEMAN AFB	2013/05/22 20:00Z	N/A	moderate	BAM	NA
ADA MOA, KS					
SEGMENT	Date/Time	NEARAD	AHAS RISK	BASED ON	HEIGHT (100ft AGL)
ADA EAST MOA, KS	2013/05/22 20:00Z	N/A	moderate	BAM	NA
ADA WEST MOA, KS	2013/05/22 20:00Z	N/A	moderate	BAM	NA
BISON MOA, KS					
SEGMENT	Date/Time	NEARAD	AHAS RISK	BASED ON	HEIGHT (100ft AGL)
BISON MOA, KS	2013/05/22 20:00Z	N/A	moderate	BAM	NA
BISON MOA, KS (XA)	2013/05/22 20:00Z	N/A	moderate	BAM	NA
CANNON MOA, MO					
SEGMENT	Date/Time	NEARAD	AHAS RISK	BASED ON	HEIGHT (100ft AGL)
CANNON A MOA, MO	2013/05/22 20:00Z	N/A	moderate	BAM	NA
CANNON B MOA, MO	2013/05/22 20:00Z	N/A	moderate	BAM	NA
EUREKA MOA, KS					
SEGMENT	Date/Time	NEARAD	AHAS RISK	BASED ON	HEIGHT (100ft AGL)
EUREKA HIGH MOA, KS	2013/05/22 20:00Z	N/A	moderate	BAM	NA

<http://www.usahas.com/print.aspx?month=5&day=22&hour=20&type=Unit&NAME=442...> 6/18/2013

EUREKA LOW MOA, KS	2013/05/22 20:00Z	N/A	moderate	BAM	NA
HOG MOA, AR					
SEGMENT	Date Time	NEXRAD	ALIAS RISK	BASED ON	HEIGHT (100ft AGL)
HOG HIGH NORTH MOA, AR	2013/05/22 20:00Z	N/A	moderate	BAM	NA
HOG HIGH SOUTH MOA, AR	2013/05/22 20:00Z	N/A	moderate	BAM	NA
HOG LOW NORTH MOA, AR	2013/05/22 20:00Z	N/A	moderate	BAM	NA
HOG LOW NORTH MOA, AR (XA)	2013/05/22 20:00Z	N/A	moderate	BAM	NA
HOG LOW NORTH MOA, AR (XB)	2013/05/22 20:00Z	N/A	low	BAM	NA
HOG LOW SOUTH MOA, AR	2013/05/22 20:00Z	N/A	moderate	BAM	NA
HOG LOW SOUTH MOA, AR (XB)	2013/05/22 20:00Z	N/A	moderate	BAM	NA
RILEY MOA, KS					
SEGMENT	Date Time	NEXRAD	ALIAS RISK	BASED ON	HEIGHT (100ft AGL)
RILEY MOA, KS	2013/05/22 20:00Z	N/A	moderate	BAM	NA
SMOKY MOA, KS					
SEGMENT	Date Time	NEXRAD	ALIAS RISK	BASED ON	HEIGHT (100ft AGL)
SMOKY HIGH MOA, KS	2013/05/22 20:00Z	N/A	low	BAM	NA
SMOKY MOA, KS	2013/05/22 20:00Z	N/A	low	BAM	NA
SMOKY MOA, KS (XA)	2013/05/22 20:00Z	N/A	moderate	BAM	NA
TRUMAN MOA, MO					
SEGMENT	Date Time	NEXRAD	ALIAS RISK	BASED ON	HEIGHT (100ft AGL)
TRUMAN A MOA, MO	2013/05/22 20:00Z	N/A	moderate	BAM	NA
TRUMAN B MOA, MO	2013/05/22 20:00Z	N/A	moderate	BAM	NA
TRUMAN C MOA, MO	2013/05/22 20:00Z	N/A	moderate	BAM	NA
FORT CHAFFEE, AR					

<http://www.usahas.com/print.aspx?month=5&day=22&hour=20&type=Unit&NAME=442...> 6/18/2013

SEGMENT	Date/Time	NEXRAD	AVIAS RISK	BASIS ON	HEIGHT (100ft AGL)
R2401A	2013/05/22 20:00Z	N/A	moderate	BAM	NA
R2401B	2013/05/22 20:00Z	N/A	moderate	BAM	NA
R2402	2013/05/22 20:00Z	N/A	moderate	BAM	NA
R2402A	2013/05/22 20:00Z	N/A	low	BAM	NA
R2402B	2013/05/22 20:00Z	N/A	low	BAM	NA
R2402C	2013/05/22 20:00Z	N/A	low	BAM	NA
BROOKVILLE, KS					
SEGMENT	Date/Time	NEXRAD	AVIAS RISK	BASIS ON	HEIGHT (100ft AGL)
R3601A	2013/05/22 20:00Z	N/A	moderate	BAM	NA
R3601B	2013/05/22 20:00Z	N/A	moderate	BAM	NA
MANITOWAN, KS					
SEGMENT	Date/Time	NEXRAD	AVIAS RISK	BASIS ON	HEIGHT (100ft AGL)
R3602A	2013/05/22 20:00Z	N/A	moderate	BAM	NA
R3602B	2013/05/22 20:00Z	N/A	moderate	BAM	NA
FORT FOX, ARDWOOD, MO					
SEGMENT	Date/Time	NEXRAD	AVIAS RISK	BASIS ON	HEIGHT (100ft AGL)
R4501A	2013/05/22 20:00Z	N/A	moderate	BAM	NA
R4501B(A)	2013/05/22 20:00Z	N/A	moderate	BAM	NA
R4501B(B)	2013/05/22 20:00Z	N/A	moderate	BAM	NA
R4501C	2013/05/22 20:00Z	N/A	moderate	BAM	NA
R4501D	2013/05/22 20:00Z	N/A	moderate	BAM	NA
R4501E	2013/05/22 20:00Z	N/A	moderate	BAM	NA

<http://www.usahas.com/print.aspx?month=5&day=22&hour=20&type=Unit&NAME=442...> 6/18/2013

R4501F	2013/05/22 20:00Z	N/A	moderate	BAM	NA
R4501H	2013/05/22 20:00Z	N/A	moderate	BAM	NA
LINDBERGH SALEM MOA, MO					
SEGMENT	Date/Time	NEXT AD	ALIAS RISK	BASED ON	HEIGHT (100ft AGL)
LINDBERGH A MOA, MO	2013/05/22 20:00Z	N/A	moderate	BAM	NA
LINDBERGH B MOA, MO	2013/05/22 20:00Z	N/A	moderate	BAM	NA
LINDBERGH C MOA, MO	2013/05/22 20:00Z	N/A	moderate	BAM	NA
SALEM MOA, MO	2013/05/22 20:00Z	N/A	low	BAM	NA
SALEM MOA, MO					
SEGMENT	Date/Time	NEXT AD	ALIAS RISK	BASED ON	HEIGHT (100ft AGL)
SALEM MOA, MO (XA)	2013/05/22 20:00Z	N/A	low	BAM	NA
SALEM MOA, MO (XB)	2013/05/22 20:00Z	N/A	low	BAM	NA

Show Hazards

<http://www.usahas.com/print.aspx?month=5&day=22&hour=20&type=Unit&NAME=442...> 6/18/2013

K2. AIRCRAFT WEIGHT AND BALANCE

DAY for 79-0164

A-10 Automated Form F

WEIGHT AND BALANCE CLEARANCE FORM F - TACTICAL					FOR USE WITH TO 1A-10C-5 AND TO 1-1B-50		
DATE(YYYY/MM/DD)		AIRCRAFT		A-10C	FROM	AS REQUIRED	HOME STATION
MISSION		DAY SERIAL NO		79-0164	TO	LOCAL PILOT	Whiteman AFB
WORST CASE CONDITIONS CALCULATIONS				REF	ITEM		
MOST FWD CONDITION					WEIGHT		
MOST AFT CONDITION					MOM/1000		
RAMP WEIGHT				41,882	17,952.2	25.8%	
Remove All Fuel				-11,086	-4,876.6	22.0%	
Most FWD Fuel Condition						22.0%	
Gear-Up Moment Change					-57.8	20.2%	
MOST FWD CG LIMIT vs ACTUAL					13,017.8	19.3% < 20.2%	
RAMP WEIGHT				41,882	17,952.2	25.8%	
Remove All Fuel				-11,086	-4,876.6	22.0%	
Most AFT Fuel Condition				11,000	4,839.5	25.8%	
Gear-Up Moment Change					-57.8	24.5%	
Light Pilot & Gear (165 lbs)					-12.4	24.7%	
Expendable Ammo and Cases Shift					-1,335	-416.2	28.2%
Window Washer Fluid (3.0 Gal)					-22	-3.5	28.4%
BDU-33B/B, D/B (STA 4/8)(6 @ 23 lbs)					-138	-58.1	28.4%
MOST AFT CG LIMIT vs ACTUAL				40,250	17,387.1	29.6% > 28.4%	
REMARKS (A ✓ in Ref 5 & 6 indicates the item is included in "Less Expendables")							
GEAR RETRACTION: -57.8							
FUEL LOADED at 6.8 LBS/GAL							
ESTIMATED LANDING FUEL: 2000 LBS (294 gallons)							
LIMITATIONS							
Ramp Weight vs Limit				41,882	<	46,000	
Takeoff CG (Gear Up)				19.3%	<	24.4%	<
Landing CG (Gear Up)				19.3%	<	26.1%	<
Most Forward CG				19.3%	<	20.2%	
Most AFT CG				28.4%	<	29.6%	
COMPUTED BY SIGNATURE							
WEIGHT AND BALANCE							
PILOT SIGNATURE							
7 Internal Fuel (1630 Gallons)				11,086	4,876.6		
8 External Fuel (0 Gallons)							
9 Ramp Weight				41,882	17,952.2		
10 Ramp CG (%MAC)					25.8%		
11 Taxi/Takeoff Fuel				-500	-217.9		
12 Gear Up Moment (GUMC)					-57.8		
13 Takeoff Weight				41,382	17,876.5		
14 Takeoff CG Gear Up (%MAC)					24.4%		
15 Remove Remaining Fuel				-10,586	-4,658.7		
30MM TP (Aerjet) (1150)/Cases shift				-1,335	-416.2		
Less Expendables				-160	-61.6		
16 Estimated Landing Fuel				2,000	888.2		
17 Estimated Landing Weight				31,300	13,428.2		
18 Estimated Landing CG Gear Up (%MAC)					25.1%		

CPN 882-AFF/A10PCSE-F001-00A REV 009

A-10 Automated Form F Version 3.4.1

INTENTIONALLY

LEFT

BLANK

TAB L
DATA FROM ON-BOARD RECORDERS

THIS TAB NOT USED

INTENTIONALLY

LEFT

BLANK

TAB M

DATA FROM GROUND RADAR AND OTHER SOURCES

THIS TAB NOT USED

INTENTIONALLY

LEFT

BLANK

TAB N

TRANSCRIPTS OF VOICE COMMUNICATIONS

N1.	MISHAP SORTIE TRANSCRIPT	N-3
------------	---------------------------------------	------------

INTENTIONALLY

LEFT

BLANK

N1. MISHAP SORTIE TRANSCRIPT

Mishap Pilot Head Up Display Transcript Aircraft Accident Investigation
A-10C, T/N 79-0164, Whiteman AFB, Missouri
22 May 2013

Hour	Time		Speaking	Transcription	Additional Sounds
	Min	Sec			
15	40	26	Start	Start	
		30	Deuce 2	(Whistling intermittently)	
		47	Deuce 1	"...direct steer point to delta 41"	
		54	Deuce 1	"Actually steer point to 91"	
		55	Deuce 2	"Two"	
	41	14	Mishap Aircraft (MA)	"Altnude, Altnude"	
		17	MA	"Altnude, Altnude"	
		25	MA	"Altnude, Altnude"	
		28	MA	"Altnude, Altnude"	
		31	Deuce 1	"1's at 9.0 push button 10"	
42	42	35	Deuce 2	"2's . . . 8.7"	
		39	MA	"Altnude, Altnude"	
		46	MA	"Altnude, Altnude"	
		54	MA	"Altnude, Altnude"	
		6	MA	"Altnude, Altnude"	
		11	MA	"Altnude, Altnude"	
		15	MA	"Altnude, Altnude"	
		18	Deuce 1	"Deuce Check . . . Deuce zero 1 . . . two chap A-10's exiting Truman C heading to Stockton Lake"	
		19	MA	"Altnude, Altnude"	
		23	MA	"Altnude, Altnude"	
	43	26	MA	"Altnude, Altnude"	
		31	MA	"Altnude, Altnude"	
		36	MA	"Altnude, Altnude"	
		41	MA	"Altnude, Altnude"	
		49	Guard	"Tulsa operations this is Delta 1206"	
		54	MA	"Altnude, Altnude"	
		59	MA	"Altnude, Altnude"	Deuce 2 Whistling
		3	MA	"Altnude, Altnude"	Deuce 2 Whistling
		6	MA	"Altnude, Altnude"	Deuce 2 Whistling
		9	MA	"Altnude, Altnude"	Deuce 2 Whistling
44	44	13	MA	"Altnude, Altnude"	Deuce 2 Whistling
		39	MA	"Altnude, Altnude"	Deuce 2 Whistling
		42	MA	"Altnude, Altnude"	
		48	MA	"Altnude, Altnude"	
		52	MA	"Altnude, Altnude"	
		16	Deuce 1	"2700 pounds a side set"	
		18	Deuce 2	"Two"	
		30	MA	"Altnude, Altnude"	

Mishap Pilot Head Up Display Transcript Aircraft Accident Investigation
A-10C, T/N 79-0164, Whiteman AFB, Missouri
22 May 2013

15	44	40	MA	"Altnude. Altnude"	
	45	2	MA	"Altnude. Altnude"	Deuce 2 Whistling
		7	MA	"Altnude. Altnude"	
		9	MA	"Altnude. Altnude"	Deuce 2 Whistling
		16	Deuce 1	"Contact tower my left 10 for 2"	Deuce 2 Whistling
		22	Deuce 2	"Contact"	
		23	MA	"Altnude. Altnude"	Deuce 2 Whistling
		30	MA	"Altnude. Altnude"	Deuce 2 Whistling
		31	MA	"Altnude. Altnude"	Deuce 2 Whistling
		40	MA	"Altnude. Altnude"	Deuce 2 Whistling
		51	MA	"Altnude. Altnude"	Deuce 2 Whistling
	46	0	MA	"Altnude. Altnude"	Deuce 2 Whistling
		5	MA	"Altnude. Altnude"	Deuce 2 Whistling
		8	MA	"Altnude. Altnude"	Deuce 2 Whistling
		9	MA	"Altnude. Altnude"	Deuce 2 Whistling
		11	MA	"Altnude. Altnude"	Deuce 2 Whistling
		13	MA	"Altnude. Altnude"	Deuce 2 Whistling
		24	MA	"Altnude. Altnude"	Deuce 2 Whistling
		32	MA	"Altnude. Altnude"	Deuce 2 Whistling
		38	MA	"Altnude. Altnude"	Deuce 2 Whistling
		40	MA	"Altnude. Altnude"	Deuce 2 Whistling
		42	MA	"Altnude. Altnude"	Deuce 2 Whistling
		51	MA	"Altnude. Altnude"	Deuce 2 Whistling
	47	8	MA	"Altnude. Altnude"	Deuce 2 Whistling
		11	MA	"Altnude. Altnude"	Deuce 2 Whistling
		32	MA	"Pull up. Pull up"	
		33	MA	"Altnude. Altnude"	
		40	Deuce 1	"Power line wires at 12 o'clock"	
		41	Deuce 2	"Two"	
		57	Deuce 2	(Whistling)	Deuce 2 Whistling
	48	4	MA	"Altnude. Altnude"	Deuce 2 Whistling
		11			Deuce 2 Whistling
		12	MA	Impact with wires (audible chop sound)	
		13	Deuce 2	"Knock it off"	
		14	Deuce 1	"Deuce 2...Deuce 1...knock it off"	
		15	Deuce 2	"Deuce 2...Knock it off"	
		21	Deuce 2	"I hit those power lines"	
		27	Deuce 1	"Copy that I going to trail...your trailing something"	
		30	Deuce 2	"Yah...hit the Maverick...hit the wing"	
		42	Guard	"Any radio Mudhog 1...2A10 3000 and below heading Fort Leonard Wood to Whiteman Air Force Base be advised"	
		48	Deuce 1	"How your aircraft flying?"	
		55	Deuce 2	"It's flying fine...I think it took out...grabbed one of the wires...took the fins off the maverick, the AIM-9...ripped off a quarter of one of the DRAs"	

Mishap Pilot Head Up Display Transcript Aircraft Accident Investigation
A-10C, T/N 79-0164, Whiteman AFB, Missouri
22 May 2013

15	49	13	Deuce 2	"Just going to come out to un-populated areas"
		15	Deuce 1	"Copy that I'm chase on you...you got the lead if you want...I can make the radios."
		22	Deuce 2	"Copy I got the lead"
		26	Deuce 1	"You are still trailing something...may be fuel...how's your fuel look"
		33	Deuce 2	"I got a right hydraulic reservoir light"
		35	Deuce 2	"Hydraulics is looking good"
		37	Deuce 1	"Go ahead and isolate"
		52	Deuce 2	"Copy...Flap, speed brakes, gear retract"
		55	Deuce 2	"I going to climb it up"
50	5		Deuce 1	"And also (in audible) of the landing gear...second row...column furthest to the right"
	18		Deuce 1	"Let's climb to the base of the clouds"
	21		Deuce 2	"I'm going to do the check list"
	22		Deuce 1	"Go ahead"
RUNNING CHECKLISTS				
15	54	55	Deuce 2	"Groundhog 1...Deuce 2"
	55	1	Groundhog 1	"GO!"
		2	Deuce 2	"Deuce 2 is an emergency...we were LATNing down at Stockton Lake and hit power lines there...got damage to my Maverick, AIM-9, DRA and cap of my bottom vertical stab. I've got a right hydraulic reservoir light...I've isolated the systems...just plan on coming straight in full stop with chase"
		31	Groundhog 1	"Copy that...so you said you hit power lines?"
		35	Deuce 2	"That a-firm...while LATNing across there...I was rejoining on the left wedge...he called them out...uhm...I call contact but when I hit them I saw 170 on RADAR"
			Groundhog 1	"Ok Copy that...so you got Left Hydraulic light indication, you got damage to the Maverick, say what else."
	57			
56	6		Deuce 2	"I've got a right hydraulic reservoir. I've isolated all my systems. I've got damage to the AIM-9, DRA, and I've got the cap on the vertical stab bottom and the BDU Ter...all BDU's are remaining and avoiding populated areas and I am going to come back in chased, straight in 19, full stop, and I will shut down on the end."
	30		Groundhog 1	"Copy that...have you done any structural damage checks...controllability checks?"
	35		Deuce 2	"Nah...I am about to do that...we're just west of Truman C at this time."
	46		Groundhog 1	"Copy that."
Controllability checks accomplished above clouds				

INTENTIONALLY

LEFT

BLANK

TAB O

ANY ADDITIONAL SUBSTANTIATING DATA and REPORTS

O1.	IN-FLIGHT SUPPLEMENTARY EVALUATION, LATN PROCEDURES ..	O-3
O2.	442 FW PRESS RELEASE OF A-10 MISHAP	O-5
O3.	KY3 ONLINE ARTICLE OF MISHAP	O-7
O4.	SPRINGFIELD NEWS-LEADER ONLINE ARTICLE OF MISHAP.....	O-9
O5.	EMAIL FROM FAA.....	O-11

INTENTIONALLY

LEFT

BLANK

01. IN-FLIGHT SUPPLEMENTARY EVALUATION, LATN PROCEDURES

SUPPLEMENTARY EVALUATION LETTER



DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE AIR FORCE RESERVE

DATE: 24 Jun 10

MEMORANDUM FOR 442 OG/CC

FROM: Lt Col Michael Leonas

SUBJECT: In-Flight Supplementary Evaluation, LATN Procedures.

1. The 442 FW leadership identified a weakness in the squadron's LATN procedures and emphasized LATN as a wing Observation for the first half of 2010. Nine sorties were sampled to identify if wing corrective actions were effective at resolving problem areas. The 9 sorties were sampled by Maj Plakyda, May Elliot and Lt Col Leonas in the month of June. Flight leads were unaware that they were the target of the Sup/Eval until after the sortie.

The overall rating for this evaluation was SATISFACTORY.

2. Strengths:
 - a. In flight execution of LATN profiles were excellent in all cases.
 - b. Minimum altitudes were briefed and complied with in all cases.
 - c. There were zero no-fly area violations, and in-flight awareness of those locations were strong.
 - d. Tower and in-flight obstacle point out procedures and com were noteworthy.
 - e. Congested areas were avoided or altitude was increased if A/C were unable to avoid those areas.
3. Areas for improvement
 - a. Preflight briefing of LATN routes and procedures were inconsistent and required details were missed on a few occasions.
 - b. Time to die charts were referenced only 1/3 of the time.
 - c. One flight executed an "impromptu" LATN and the air briefing was insufficient.
 - d. Maximum and minimum airspeeds were not consistently briefed
4. Findings:
 - a. NONE
4. Recommendations:

- a. LATN execution in-flight was strong on all occasions. Recommend downgrading LATN procedures from an Observation to an emphasis item. Also, Sup/Eval results should be briefed to the squadron with emphasis on preflight briefing discrepancies.


MICHAEL D. LEONAS, Lt Col, USAFR
442 OG/OGV Chief

O2. 442 FW PRESS RELEASE OF A-10 MISHAP



United States Air Force Reserve News Release

442nd Fighter Wing Public Affairs Office
931 Arnold Ave., Whiteman AFB, Mo. 65305-5070
Phone: (660) 687-3842 Fax: (660) 687-2985

May. 23, 2013
Release No. 13-05-23

A-10 strikes overhead lines near Stockton Lake

By Tech. Sgt. Danielle Johnston

WHITEMAN AIR FORCE BASE, Mo. – A-10 Thunderbolt II assigned to the 442nd Fighter Wing at Whiteman AFB struck an overhead line near Stockton Lake, Mo. The aircraft was on a local, low altitude, navigational-training mission. The pilot returned safely to Whiteman AFB and did not sustain any injuries. The estimated damage to the aircraft is unknown at this time. The event is under investigation in accordance with Air Force safety regulations.

The 442nd Fighter Wing is an A-10 Thunderbolt II Air Force Reserve unit here.

-30-

INTENTIONALLY


LEFT

BLANK

03. KY3 ONLINE ARTICLE OF MISHAP

Fighter jet clips power lines over Stockton Lake - KY3

Page 1 of 1



STOCKTON LAKE, MO. (KY3) — A-10C Thunderbolt II fighter jet clipped two power lines over Stockton Lake on Wednesday, May 22, 2013.

RELATED ARTICLES

Whiteman AFB says one of its A-10C jets clipped power line

Officials at Whiteman AFB say their plane clipped power line

RELATED LINKS

Whiteman AFB says one of its A-10C jets clipped power line

Fighter jet clips power lines over Stockton Lake

The A-10C Warthog returned safely to Whiteman Air Force Base after incident

May 23, 2013 by Mike Landis, KY3 News mlandis@ky3.com

STOCKTON LAKE, MO. — Whiteman Air Force Base confirms two of its A-10C "Warthog" fighter jets were doing routine training flights over Stockton Lake on Wednesday. One of those jets clipped two power lines spanning the lake.

Boaters like Andrew Struge and Kayla Struge were used to seeing Air Force planes doing maneuvers over the lake.

However, on Tuesday, something was different.

"One went underneath the power lines, the second one tried doing it and clipped it with its wing and all of it dropped," stated Struge.

The Air Force says a wing on a jet sliced through two wires at the top of the transmission towers carrying the lines high above the lake.

"At first I thought they dropped something from the plane. It kind of freaked me out. But, all of the sudden we saw the power lines were broken," recalled Struge.

The plane was not severely damaged, and the pilot wasn't hurt. Both aircraft were able to return to Whiteman AFB.

Those on the lake were left a bit shocked by what they'd seen.

"We were all freaking out thinking we should get out of this spot and left," said Struge.

The lines belong to KANSAS POWER, which says the two lines severed were used to attract lightning. There wasn't any power running through them, though there was in the remaining three lines.

Nobody is coming without power because of the incident. KANSAS POWER says electricity is still running to customers via other connections in KANSAS's system.

Until those big repairs can be made, troopers with the Missouri Highway Patrol Water Division will be out here on Stockton Lake keeping boaters away from the area. KANSAS POWER says the wires should be out of the water by this weekend.

Whiteman says the jets were flying low on purpose for this particular mission. The "Warthogs" routinely fly at low altitudes in support of ground forces on the battlefield.

KY3

Copyright 2013 KY3 TV

Links by Raymond | Index by Dave | Privacy Policy | About Us

http://articles.ky3.com/2013-05-23/power-lines_39483002

6/10/2013

INTENTIONALLY

LEFT

BLANK

O4. SPRINGFIELD NEWS-LEADER ONLINE ARTICLE OF MISHAP

A-10 jet severs two protective cables above power lines at Stockton Lake | Springfield Ne... Page 1 of 1

A-10 jet severs two protective cables above power lines at Stockton Lake

Written by Wes Johnson

news-
leader.com

A low-flying A-10 Thunderbolt II military jet hit two protective cables above a major power transmission line crossing Stockton Lake Wednesday afternoon, and boaters are being kept away from the downed cables.

Danielle Johnston, spokeswoman with the Air Force Reserve's 442nd Fighter Wing at Whiteman Air Force Base, confirmed that two of the unit's A-10 planes were flying together when one hit the cables near the town of Bona.

Johnston said the pilot was uninjured and returned safely to Whiteman. The pilot was on a local low altitude, navigational-training mission and has been removed from flight status until an investigation is completed.

"The estimated damage to the aircraft is unknown at this time," Johnston said in an email. "The event is under investigation in accordance with Air Force safety regulations."

A 10 Thunderbolts are single-seat, twin-engine attack jets designed to provide close support for ground troops

The Army Corp is working with the Missouri Highway Patrol's water patrol division to mark the area with buoys to keep boaters away from submerged cables. Corps spokesman Dave Kolarik said the lines are owned by Vinita, Okla.-based KAMO Electric Cooperative.

"Our role in this is fairly limited," Kolarik said.

Ted Hilmes, chief operating officer of KAMO, said the jet hit the two "static cables" in the middle of the transmission line span, where it crosses the lake just south of the Highway 245 bridge. The static cables, made of aluminum and copper, don't carry power but help protect transmission lines from lightning and other hazards.

After the jet hit the static wires, Hilmes said electrical system monitors immediately sensed a problem and shut off power to the three transmission lines. The transmission lines remain de-energized while a repair plan is put in place. Hilmes said repairs might take up to two months to complete and could possibly involve a helicopter to restring the static cables across the lake.

Power has been rerouted and no customers lost service, he said.

"We'd like people to know that, yes, the line is out of service and there is no risk of any electrical contact to the public," Hilmes said. "The Corps and Water Patrol quickly placed emergency buoys in the water to mark potentially hazardous areas."

<http://www.news-leader.com/article/20130523/NEWS01/305230132/A-10-jet-severs-two-...> 6/13/2013

INTENTIONALLY

LEFT

BLANK

05. EMAIL FROM FAA

Request for information Stockton Lake.

Page 1 of 1

Request for information Stockton Lake.

McCarron, Paula [REDACTED]

Sent: Tuesday, June 25, 2013 10:04

To: McCarron, Paula [REDACTED]

From: [REDACTED]

Sent: Tuesday, June 25, 2013 08:11

To: McCarron, Paula

Subject: RE: EXTERNAL: Request for information Stockton Lake.

Lt Col McCarron,

According to our records, on 10/04/2007 KAMO Electric Cooperative submitted four aeronautical studies with the Federal Aviation Administration to evaluate the height / location of the transmission line. The FAA determined the cables did not present a hazard, but the two studies exceeding 200 feet AGL would require marking and lighting in accordance with Advisory Circular AC 70/7460-1K, Obstruction Marking and Lighting. According to our records, KAMO elected to build at 198 feet AGL in order to NOT have to mark or light the cables. With that representation by KAMO, the FAA determined that marking was not required. The other two studies timed-out and were terminated.

[REDACTED]
Supervisor (A), Obstruction Evaluation Group, A/V-15
4500 Mercantile Plaza, Suite 200
Fort Worth, Texas 76136
Phone:

For more information, go to:
<https://oeaaa.faa.gov>

<https://webmail.hq.af.mil/owa/?ac=Item&t=IPM.Note&id=RgAAAACKg4QJbgqdRpzDn...> 6/25/2013

INTENTIONALLY

LEFT

BLANK

TAB P

DAMAGE SUMMARIES

P1. SUMMARY AND COSTS OF DAMAGE.....P-3

INTENTIONALLY

LEFT

BLANK

P1. SUMMARY AND COSTS OF DAMAGE

The MA impacted two cables that spanned Stockton Lake, MO. Damage or replacement of these cables is currently undetermined. The MA sustained considerable damage, listed below. The MA returned to homestation and there is no reported loss of life.

Nomenclature of Damaged Parts	Image Ref in Tab S.3	Action	Parts/COST	Man Hrs	Man hr Cost
Training AGM-65	1-5	REPLACE	\$188,000.00	48	\$2,208.00
Horizontal Stabilizer and associated mainteance	6-11	REPLACE	\$111,717.54	208	\$9,568.00
Right Rudder	12-15	REPLACE	\$101,865.00	10	\$460.00
Right Vertical Stabilizer	16-19	REPLACE	\$49,147.29	40	\$1,840.00
LAU-117 Maverick Launch Unit	2-4	REPLACE	\$43,000.00	8	\$368.00
Left Wing Tip	20-21	REPLACE	\$30,700.00	24	\$1,104.00
Left Lower Speed Brake Board	22-23	REPLACE	\$30,037.00	120	\$5,520.00
Dual Rail Assembly	24	REPLACE	\$24,892.00	8	\$368.00
Training CATM-9M Guidance Control System and Fins	25	REPLACE	\$24,852.14	24	\$1,104.00
#2 Eng Hydraulic pump		REPLACE	\$14,670.00	5	\$230.00
Right Horizontal Stabilizer Leading Edge Panels (Middle E-46 and Outboard E-24) and Ribs	26-29	REPLACE	\$7,106.00	16	\$736.00
Full Painted Including Supplies		REPAINT	\$4,500.00	400	\$18,400.00
Situational Awareness Data Link (SADL) Antenna	30-31	REPLACE	\$4,379.33	6	\$276.00
Left LAU-105 Missile Launch Rail	24	REPLACE	\$4,329.50	8	\$368.00
Right Vertical Stabilizer lower cap	32-34	REPLACE	\$3,500.00	4	\$184.00
Right RADAR Altimeter Antenna and Cables	6, 35, 36	REPLACE	\$2,910.60	32	\$1,472.00
Right Lower Rudder Cap	32-34, 37	REPLACE	\$1,900.00	16	\$736.00
Left Tire	38	REPLACE	\$868.00	5	\$230.00
Right Rudder Actuator Cables	6, 35, 39	REPLACE	\$424.00	16	\$736.00
MAU-40 Bomb Release Rack	40-42	REPAIR	\$236.63	20	\$920.00
Left Outboard Flap	43-44	REPAIR	\$205.00	8	\$368.00
Left Gear Pod	45-47	REPAIR	\$175.00	8	\$368.00
Auxiliary Power Unit Drain tubs (4 each)	48-49	REPAIR	\$150.00	6	\$276.00
Bomb Dummy Unit BDU-33	50	REPLACE	\$45.54	2	\$92.00
Right LAU-105 Missile Launch Rail	24	REPAIR	\$28.12	10	\$460.00
Right Rudder Actuator Hydraulic Line	28, 51	REPAIR	\$0.00	8	\$368.00
Weapons Pylon Station #3	3-5	REPAIR	\$0.00	4	\$184.00
Electrical Wire (lighting to right vertical stabilizer)	36, 39	REPAIR	\$0.00	6	\$276.00
TOTAL			\$649,638.69	1070	\$49,220.00

GRAND TOTAL= Parts + Man hr Cost (assuming \$46 per hour field level)	\$698,858.69
--	---------------------

INTENTIONALLY

LEFT

BLANK

TAB Q

AIB TRANSFER DOCUMENTS

Q1. INVENTORY LIST Q-3

INTENTIONALLY

LEFT

BLANK



DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
AIR FORCE RESERVE COMMAND

30 May 2013

MEMORANDUM FOR PRESIDENT, AFI 51-503 ACCIDENT BOARD

FROM: Chief of Safety

SUBJECT: Inventory List, Class C Mishap, A-10, SN 79-0164, 22 May 2013

1. The following items are released to the AFI 51-503 Accident Investigation Board:

- ✓ a. Pilot flight records. 1Lt Aaron Berry/1Lt Sven Loeffler, 687-2740.
- ✓ b. Mission paperwork/pilot flight pubs. 1Lt Aaron Berry/1Lt Sven Loeffler, 687-2740.
- ✓ c. SOF paperwork. 1Lt Aaron Berry/1Lt Sven Loeffler, 687-2740.
- ✓ d. RMMDs and DTCs. 1Lt Aaron Berry/1Lt Sven Loeffler, 687-2740. - *classified*
- ✓ e. 303 FS Letter of Xs. 1Lt Aaron Berry/1Lt Sven Loeffler, 687-2740.
- f. Aircraft S/N 79-0164 at facility 1118. Aircraft impounding official, MSgt Dale Taylor, 687-2811.
- g. Engine and aircraft records. Aircraft impounding official, MSgt Dale Taylor, 687-2811.
- h. Medical and dental records (TOX Test). Capt Gary Dorazio, Flight Surgeon, 687-2811.
- ✓ i. All releasable photographs (on DVD). 1Lt Aaron Berry/1Lt Sven Loeffler, 687-2740.
- j. KAMO Power Company POC, Randy Buchanan, 918-244-2042 or 918-256-1831.
- ✓ k. Power line marking requirements document. 1Lt Aaron Berry/1Lt Sven Loeffler, 687-2740.

2. Please reply by endorsement below that you are in receipt of these items and take responsibility for their final disposition.




PATRICK F. MURPHY, Lt Col, USAFR
Chief of Safety

1st Ind, President, AFI 51-503 Accident Board

MEMORANDUM FOR Safety Investigation Board

Acknowledge receipt and responsibility for items listed above.



WILLIAM A. LYONS, Col, USAFR
President, AFI 51-503 Accident Board

TAB R

RELEASABLE WITNESS TESTIMONY

R1.	CAPTAIN NICHOLAS DECKER.....	R-3
R2.	CAPTAIN PATRICK GLEN.....	R-5
R3.	CAPTAIN PAUL DORAN.....	R-7
R4.	CHIEF MASTER SERGEANT RICHARD HARTER.....	R-9
R5.	LIEUTENANT COLONEL JOHN MARKS	R-11
R6.	LIEUTENANT COLONEL JOSHUA RUDELL	R-13
R7.	LIEUTENANT COLONEL MICHAEL LEONAS	R-15
R8.	LIEUTENANT COLONEL PATRICK MURPHY.....	R-17
R9.	LIEUTENANT COLONEL PRESTON MCCONNELL.....	R-19
R10.	LIEUTENANT COLONEL STEPHEN NESTER	R-21
R11.	MAJOR CHAD CARLTON	R-23
R12.	MAJ SIEMS' VERBATIM TESTIMONY.....	R-25
R13.	MASTER SERGEANT KEITH PAWENSKI.....	R-55
R14	TECHNICAL SERGEANT BRIAN GILLESPIE.....	R-57
R15.	TECHNICAL SERGEANT CAROLYN SCHAFFER.....	R-59
R16	TECHNICAL SERGEANT DONALD DEMARCO.....	R-61
R17.	TECHNICAL SERGEANT KENNETH CAMPBELL.....	R-63
R18.	TECHNICAL SERGEANT KEVIN BALANDRON	R-65
R19.	TECHNICAL SERGEANT MICHAEL PILKINGTON.....	R-67
R20.	TECHNICAL SERGEANT WILLIAM FLEER.....	R-69

INTENTIONALLY

LEFT

BLANK

SUMMARIZED STATEMENT OF

Captain Nicholas Coggeshall Decker

Capt Nicholas Coggeshall Decker appeared before the Accident Investigation Board, was sworn, and testified substantially as follows:

I, Capt Nicholas Coggeshall Decker, of the 303rd Fighter Squadron (FS) at Whiteman Air Force Base (AFB), Missouri, after being placed under oath, hereby state that before my interview, the difference between the nature of an accident investigation board (AIB) under AFI 51-503 and a safety investigation board (SIB) under AFI 91-204 was explained to me. I understand the difference between an AIB and SIB. I acknowledge that the purpose of this AIB is to produce a publicly releasable report on the facts and circumstances surrounding this accident and to gather and preserve evidence for use in claims, litigation, disciplinary actions, adverse administrative proceedings, and for all other purposes. I understand that my AIB testimony may be used for any proper purpose and can be released to the public.

I am an Air Reserve Technician. I don't remember what status I was in on 22 May 2013. On 21 May 2013, I think I was in civilian status and then flew that night on an additional flying training period. I have been the chief of scheduling at the 303rd FS for 8 months. I have been in the Air Force since January 2005 and at Whiteman AFB since September 2007.

I flew with the Mishap Pilot (MP) on 21 May 2013. I was the flight lead. I think we took off around 2030 hours and landed about 2230 hours. I left the squadron around 2340 hours. I don't believe the MP left at the same time I did. I think he was still at the squadron when I left, but I do not know what time he left. We were both flying the next day.

The MP was sort of excited about our mission on 21 May 2013 because he needed "weapons squares." It was a pretty benign flight.

//Signed//

NICHOLAS C. DECKER, Capt, USAF
Chief, Scheduling, 303rd FS

Signed and sworn before me this 10th day of June 2013.

//Signed//

WILLIAM A. LYONS, Colonel, USAFR
President, Accident Investigation Board

INTENTIONALLY

LEFT

BLANK

SUMMARIZED STATEMENT OF

Captain Patrick Thomas Glen

Capt Patrick Thomas Glen appeared before the Accident Investigation Board, was sworn, and testified substantially as follows:

I, Capt Patrick Thomas Glen, of the 495th Fighter Group (FG), Detachment 303 at Whiteman Air Force Base, Missouri, after being placed under oath, hereby state that before my interview, the difference between the nature of an accident investigation board (AIB) under AFI 51-503 and a safety investigation board (SIB) under AFI 91-204 was explained to me. I understand the difference between an AIB and SIB. I acknowledge that the purpose of this AIB is to produce a publicly releasable report on the facts and circumstances surrounding this accident and to gather and preserve evidence for use in claims, litigation, disciplinary actions, adverse administrative proceedings, and for all other purposes. I understand that my AIB testimony may be used for any proper purpose and can be released to the public.

I have been the Chief of Readiness at the 303rd Fighter Squadron (FS) since March 2012. I received my Air Force commission through the Reserve Officers Training Corps. This is my first operational A-10 assignment.

I believe I have flown about two low altitude tactical navigation flights over Stockton Lake in Missouri. I don't think I have ever seen the power lines at the southern part of the lake.

With regard to obstacle detection and avoidance, flight lead would be directive, then descriptive. Pilots in the 303rd FS regularly handle it that way. I recall a squadron requirement to reset minimum altitude warnings. I do. Typically, minimum altitudes are briefed pre-flight. Most flight leads don't verbalize changes in minimum altitudes. The moving map should be set to 5 nautical miles depressed. I think that is in our squadron standards.

I have known the Mishap Pilot (MP) professionally since 2012. We do socialize at squadron functions. I have flown with him about six times. He is 100% professional. I have never witnessed nor heard of him violating flight rules.

The 303rd FS's reputation is as one of the most highly respected flying A-10 units. There is no difference between an active duty flight lead and the reserve flight leads here.

//Signed//

PATRICK T. GLEN, Capt, USAF
Chief, Readiness, 303rd FS

Signed and sworn before me this ____ day of June 2013.

//Signed//

WILLIAM A. LYONS, Colonel, USAFR
President, Accident Investigation Board

SUMMARIZED STATEMENT OF

Captain Paul Gardner Doran

Capt Paul Gardner Doran appeared before the Accident Investigation Board, was sworn, and testified substantially as follows:

I, Capt Paul Gardner Doran, of the 495th Fighter Group (FG), Detachment 303 at Whiteman Air Force Base (AFB), Missouri, after being placed under oath, hereby state that before my interview, the difference between the nature of an accident investigation board (AIB) under AFI 51-503 and a safety investigation board (SIB) under AFI 91-204 was explained to me. I understand the difference between an AIB and SIB. I acknowledge that the purpose of this AIB is to produce a publicly releasable report on the facts and circumstances surrounding this accident and to gather and preserve evidence for use in claims, litigation, disciplinary actions, adverse administrative proceedings, and for all other purposes. I understand that my AIB testimony may be used for any proper purpose and can be released to the public.

I have been the Chief of the Mission Planning Cell for approximately 6 months. I received my Air Force commission on 2 June 2004. I have been at Whiteman AFB for almost 2 years.

I was not working on 22 May 2013. I was on leave at a funeral. I have flown a low altitude tactical navigation flight over Stockton Lake in Missouri only once, but don't remember if it was over the southern part of the lake.

It is everyone's responsibility to announce obstacles. The wingman should respond "contact" or "negative contact." If neither of those occurs, I, if I were flight lead, would be more directive. I believe unit pilots regularly handle it that way. Minimum altitude warnings require confirmatory communication (e.g., "number one 100' bug set"). I would require my wingman to repeat that to me. I don't believe there is a squadron standard for the scale of the moving map.

I have known the Mishap Pilot (MP) for about 2 years. We occasionally socialize outside the squadron. For example, my wife and I have gone wine tasting with him and his wife. I did not notice any changes in him prior to the mishap, to include marital problems. I think I have flown with him a dozen times. He is sharp, quick to analyze tactical problems and is a good instructor pilot (IP). He's competent and an above average IP. I can't remember ever witnessing or heard of him violating flight rules.

The best word to describe the 303rd FS is “experienced.” That experience can also generate familiarity.

//Signed//

PAUL G. DORAN, Capt, USAF
Chief, Readiness, 303rd FS

Signed and sworn before me this ____ day of June 2013.

//Signed//

WILLIAM A. LYONS, Colonel, USAFR
President, Accident Investigation Board

SUMMARIZED STATEMENT OF

WS-12/CMSgt Richard L. Harter

Mr. Richard Harter appeared before the Accident Investigation Board, was sworn, and testified substantially as follows:

I, Mr. Richard Harter, of the 442d Aircraft Maintenance Squadron at Whiteman Air Force Base, Missouri, after being placed under oath, hereby state that before my interview, the difference between the nature of an accident investigation board (AIB) under AFI 51-503 and a safety investigation board (SIB) under AFI 91-204 was explained to me. I understand the difference between an AIB and SIB. I acknowledge that the purpose of this AIB is to produce a publicly releasable report on the facts and circumstances surrounding this accident and to gather and preserve evidence for use in claims, litigation, disciplinary actions, adverse administrative proceedings, and for all other purposes. I understand that my AIB testimony may be used for any proper purpose and can be released to the public.

I am an Air Reserve Technician and was on civilian status on 22 May 2013. I have been in the Air Force for 33 years. I have been the nightshift Production Superintendant for 7 years. As a Production Superintendant, I am responsible for leading and managing the aircraft maintenance production effort to accomplish scheduled and un-scheduled maintenance while ensuring aircraft fleet health and successful execution of the posted flying schedule.

Nightshift begins at 1430 hours, but I came in at 1330 hours. I have a Land Mobile Radio that also receives Ultra-High Frequency transmissions which enables me to hear pilot communications for calling in landing status codes. I heard over the radio, the Mishap Pilot (MP) call in stating that he hit wires, was losing hydraulics, and that his wingman would be in trail following him, avoiding populated areas. I directed a tow team be put together and initiated our In-Flight-Emergency checklists. I proceeded down to the North Hammerhead End of Runway aircraft parking area and waited for the pilot to land. The 509th Bomb Wing Fire department, safety, our tow team, and the 442d Crash, Damaged, Disable Aircraft Recovery Team were all on scene. I do not recall if an ambulance was present.

The aircraft landed and came to a stop at the North End Hammerhead. The master sergeant in charge of the Fire Department told me everything looked fine. After getting clearance from the on-scene commander, the aircraft was shut down by the tow team. The fire department turned the aircraft over to me. I let the MP to ride back in the aircraft since the emergency vehicles had departed. The aircraft had to be "chalk walked" back to the parking ramp because the power was off and the emergency brake accumulators were depleted because they were used during the landing. When an aircraft is "chalk walked," technicians walk along either side of the aircraft with a set of parking chinks while the tow vehicle slowly tows the aircraft back to the parking area.

After the aircraft arrived at the parking spot, the pilot deplaned and was escorted off by other pilots. I directed that oil samples be taken, due to the time sensitive nature of its testing. 509th Bomb Wing Public Affairs, 509th Bomb Wing Safety and 442d Fighter Wing Safety were present on the ramp. I impounded the aircraft and began sequestering equipment and forms. I did not talk to the MP.

//Signed//

RICHARD L. HARTER , WS-12/CMSgt, USAFR
Production Superintendent, 442d Aircraft Maintenance Sq

Signed and sworn before me this ____ day of Jun 2013.

//Signed//

WILLIAM A. LYONS, Colonel, USAFR
President, Accident Investigation Board

SUMMARIZED STATEMENT OF

GS-13/Lieutenant Colonel John Philip Marks

Lt Col John Philip Marks, appeared before the Accident Investigation Board, was sworn, and testified substantially as follows:

I, Lt Col John Philip Marks, of the 303rd Fighter Squadron (FS) at Whiteman Air Force Base (AFB), Missouri, after being placed under oath, hereby state that before my interview, the difference between the nature of an accident investigation board (AIB) under AFI 51-503 and a safety investigation board (SIB) under AFI 91-204 was explained to me. I understand the difference between an AIB and SIB. I acknowledge that the purpose of this AIB is to produce a publicly releasable report on the facts and circumstances surrounding this accident and to gather and preserve evidence for use in claims, litigation, disciplinary actions, adverse administrative proceedings, and for all other purposes. I understand that my AIB testimony may be used for any proper purpose and can be released to the public.

I am an Air Reserve Technician. I was in civilian status on 22 May 2013, the day of the mishap sortie. I have been an Assistant Director of Operations for 4 years. I have been in the Air Force for 26 years. I separated from active duty and joined the Air Force Reserves in May 2001.

On 22 May 2013, I was giving a tactical simulator mission. While doing that, I got a phone call that there had been an "incident." I went to the Operations counter to assist with recovery of "Deuce 02," the mishap aircraft (MA), who indicated he hit power lines. I stayed in the operations building and assisted the supervisor of flying with checklists. There was no discussion about the Mishap Pilot (MP) "riding the brakes" back after landing. I don't know if there was a medical response to the in-flight emergency (IFE). It's not abnormal here if only the fire department responds to an IFE. I have flown over Stockton Lake in Missouri, but it's been several years. I have seen wires near the area of the mishap. I don't believe there are any markers on the wires.

Standard A-10 procedure for obstacles is to call it out if one is a factor. I would expect to hear "contact." If I didn't, I would confirm no contact and then direct a climb. I think 303rd FS pilots comply with those standards. Minimum altitude warnings should be set for the lowest authorized altitude of the mission. Local chapter 8 requires the scale of the tactical awareness display when using the moving map to be set at 1:500,000 or smaller. I don't think there is confusion in the squadron about the legal altitudes when using the military operations area. I am confident it is clear to everyone what is approved and not approved to do.

I have known the Mishap Pilot (MP) since he's been in the unit. We have normal reserve social interaction. I've flown with him. He's a very solid and well prepared pilot. I have no memory of the MP violating flight rules. I did not notice anything out of the ordinary about him in the 3

to 4 days prior to the mishap. My daughters have mentioned that his three young children are a "handful," but I am not aware of any specific personal issues he is having.

Of the four A-10 units in 8th Air Force (when it was in 8th Air Force), the 303rd FS was by far the most professional. The 303rd FS needs to lead the active duty members by example. In the past, there were people we had to let go because they were doing things they shouldn't have been doing.

//Signed//

JOHN P. MARKS, Lt Col, USAFR
Assistant Director of Operations, 303rd FS

Signed and sworn before me this ____ day of June 2013.

//Signed//

WILLIAM A. LYONS, Colonel, USAFR
President, Accident Investigation Board

SUMMARIZED STATEMENT OF

Lieutenant Colonel Joshua Bradford Ruddell

Lt Col Joshua Bradford Ruddell, appeared before the Accident Investigation Board, was sworn, and testified substantially as follows:

I, Lt Col Joshua Bradford Ruddell, of the 495th Fighter Group (FG), Detachment 303, at Whiteman Air Force Base (AFB), Missouri, after being placed under oath, hereby state that before my interview, the difference between the nature of an accident investigation board (AIB) under AFI 51-503 and a safety investigation board (SIB) under AFI 91-204 was explained to me. I understand the difference between an AIB and SIB. I acknowledge that the purpose of this AIB is to produce a publicly releasable report on the facts and circumstances surrounding this accident and to gather and preserve evidence for use in claims, litigation, disciplinary actions, adverse administrative proceedings, and for all other purposes. I understand that my AIB testimony may be used for any proper purpose and can be released to the public.

I am the Detachment 303 Commander, and have been here since July 2012. I have been in the Air Force for 18 years.

On 22 May 2013, I heard on the radio that an aircraft was coming in with battle damage. I have flown near Stockton Lake in Missouri, but not over the southern part. I am not aware of power lines at the southern part of the lake.

If I called out an obstacle, I would want some confirmatory response from my wingman. 303rd FS pilots generally comply with those procedures. I will tell my wingman to reset minimum altitude warnings in flight if minimum altitudes change during the mission. This is also a widely used technique here. There is a risk of becoming desensitized to the minimum altitude warnings when doing low altitude tactical navigation over rolling hills. I am not sure if there is a unit standard with regard to the setting on the moving map. I predominantly use a 5 to 10 mile scope for LATN.

I have known the MP since July 2011. We don't socialize. I've flown with him maybe two to four times. He's very professional and competent. He's one that follows the rules. I have not noticed any change in his demeanor prior to the mishap, but I have not been spending much time in the squadron.

The 303rd FS has a reputation as solid unit that is very professional and follows the rules.

//Signed//

JOSHUA B. RUDDLELL, Lt Col, USAF
Commander, Detachment 303

Signed and sworn before me this ____ day of June 2013.

//Signed//

WILLIAM A. LYONS, Colonel, USAFR
President, Accident Investigation Board

SUMMARIZED STATEMENT OF

GS-13/Lt Col Michael D. Leonas

Lt Col Michael D. Leonas appeared before the Accident Investigation Board, was sworn, and testified substantially as follows:

I, Lt Col Michael D. Leonas, of the 303rd Fighter Squadron (FS) at Whiteman Air Force Base, Missouri, after being placed under oath, hereby state that before my interview, the difference between the nature of an accident investigation board (AIB) under AFI 51-503 and a safety investigation board (SIB) under AFI 91-204 was explained to me. I understand the difference between an AIB and SIB. I acknowledge that the purpose of this AIB is to produce a publicly releasable report on the facts and circumstances surrounding this accident and to gather and preserve evidence for use in claims, litigation, disciplinary actions, adverse administrative proceedings, and for all other purposes. I understand that my AIB testimony may be used for any proper purpose and can be released to the public.

I am an Air Reserve Technician. I was in civilian status on 22 May 2013, the day of the mishap sortie. As the Assistant Director of Operations, I am responsible for supporting the ongoing daily operations of the 303rd FS. I have been in the Air Force since 1990. I was on active duty as a T-37 and T-3A instructor pilot and an A-10 pilot serving with several units before joining the Air Force Reserves. I have been with the 303rd FS over eight years. I have well over 2500 hours of A-10 flight time and recently was the Chief of Standardization and Evaluation.

On numerous times over the years, I have flown low altitude over Stockton Lake. I am aware there were power lines in the area of the mishap site. I do not remember if there were any markers on those power lines that cross the lake.

Our squadron standards discuss what flight members should accomplish if they encounter any towers or obstacles along their route of flight. The expected response is "contact," when an obstacle is called out. If I did not get that response, I would be more directive to get the wingman's attention. It is not standard to fly below 500 feet in the Truman C Military Operations Area (MOA). I emphasize proper low altitude tactical navigation procedures (LATN) at all times. In that regard, I mandate that my flight members acknowledge when resetting altitude alerts when transitioning from one area to the next.

I have known the Mishap Pilot (MP) professionally and socially for over ten years. I have flown a handful of times with him and have given him at least one check ride. I have nothing negative to say about the MP. He is one of the better prepared pilots. I have never seen the MP willfully violate flight rules.

Overall, my impression of the 303rd FS is that it is solid unit that adheres to flight discipline, and rules. It is the most experienced squadron to which I've been assigned.

In June 2010, I conducted an in-flight supplementary evaluation on LATN to rectify a recent weakness in the unit's LATN procedures. The entire unit performed satisfactorily, and the results were debriefed to the 442nd Operations Group Commander. LATN has also been carried as an evaluation "emphasis item" since then.

//Signed//

MICHAEL D. LEONAS, Lt Col, USAFR
Assistant Director of Operations, 303rd FS

Signed and sworn before me this 13th day of June 2013.

//Signed//

WILLIAM A. LYONS, Colonel, USAFR
President, Accident Investigation Board

SUMMARIZED STATEMENT OF

GS-13/Lieutenant Colonel Patrick Francis Murphy, II

Lt Col Patrick Francis Murphy, II, appeared before the Accident Investigation Board, was sworn, and testified substantially as follows:

I, Lt Col Patrick Francis Murphy, II, of the 442d Fighter Wing (FW), at Whiteman Air Force Base (AFB), Missouri, after being placed under oath, hereby state that before my interview, the difference between the nature of an accident investigation board (AIB) under AFI 51-503 and a safety investigation board (SIB) under AFI 91-204 was explained to me. I understand the difference between an AIB and SIB. I acknowledge that the purpose of this AIB is to produce a publicly releasable report on the facts and circumstances surrounding this accident and to gather and preserve evidence for use in claims, litigation, disciplinary actions, adverse administrative proceedings, and for all other purposes. I understand that my AIB testimony may be used for any proper purpose and can be released to the public.

I am an Air Reserve Technician. I was in military status at the time of the mishap on 22 May 2013. I have been in the Air Force since 1977 and at Whiteman AFB since 1988. I have been the wing Chief of Safety for 8 years. I have approximately 1500 flying hours in the A-10.

I was flying a sortie at the time of the mishap on 22 May 2013. I landed before the Mishap Pilot (MP). I don't go to Stockton Lake in Missouri often. I don't recall being over the southeastern part of the lake. Prior to the mishap, I was not aware of power lines there.

Whoever sees an obstacle should call it out. Others should confirm "contact." If there is no response, you should do something to get their attention. The practice in the unit is to brief minimum altitude warnings and verbalize changes in flight. Over the years, the A-10 mission has changed, so low altitude tactical navigation isn't as big a part of each mission.

On 22 May 2013, I received notification of the mishap while I was in flight. I don't know who said it was okay to let the MP ride the brakes while the mishap aircraft was being towed back.

I have known the MP since 1994. I have no social interactions with him. He is a good guy who is trying to comply with all this stuff people expect him to do. In my opinion, there is too much going on in the 303rd FS. Everyone is being asked to do too much. I have flown with him, but not that often. He is top notch, always trying to improve. There is no scuttlebutt about him violating flight rules. The whole incident with regard to the MP is shocking to me.

The 303rd FS is a squadron to which people want to be assigned.

//Signed//
PATRICK F. MURPHY, II, Lt Col, USAFR
Chief, Safety, 442d FW

Signed and sworn before me this ____ day of June 2013.

//Signed//
WILLIAM A. LYONS, Colonel, USAFR
President, Accident Investigation Board

SUMMARIZED STATEMENT OF

GS-14/Lieutenant Colonel Preston Jock McConnell

Lt Col Preston Jock McConnell, appeared before the Accident Investigation Board, was sworn, and testified substantially as follows:

I, Lt Col Preston Jock McConnell, of the 303rd Fighter Squadron (FS) at Whiteman Air Force Base (AFB), Missouri, after being placed under oath, hereby state that before my interview, the difference between the nature of an accident investigation board (AIB) under AFI 51-503 and a safety investigation board (SIB) under AFI 91-204 was explained to me. I understand the difference between an AIB and SIB. I acknowledge that the purpose of this AIB is to produce a publicly releasable report on the facts and circumstances surrounding this accident and to gather and preserve evidence for use in claims, litigation, disciplinary actions, adverse administrative proceedings, and for all other purposes. I understand that my AIB testimony may be used for any proper purpose and can be released to the public.

I am an Air Reserve Technician. I was on duty in civilian status on 22 May 2013, the day of the mishap sortie. I have been the Director of Operations as the 303rd FS for 2 years and 8 months. I have been with the 303rd FS for 5 years. I've been in the Air Force for 18 years. I have been an A-10 pilot since 1998. I graduated from the Weapons School in 2003. I separated from active duty in August 2008 and joined the Air Force Reserves. I have been with five A-10 units in the course of my career.

I was the supervisor of flying and "top 3" at the time of the mishap. It was a nice weather day. The winds were light and bird activity was low; it was a visual flight rules day. The mishap sortie was the second launch of the day on 22 May 2013. I don't believe the mishap aircraft flew the first launch.

I have flown low altitude tactical navigation (LATN) over Stockton Lake in Missouri, but not regularly. I can't recall flying there and ever thinking about the wire the mishap aircraft hit.

Standard procedure for obstacles is to call them out (directive, descriptive) and get an acknowledgment. I expect to hear "contact." If I don't get that response, I will follow up with another call to avoid the obstacle. Everyone I have flown with in the squadron has used that standard. We preach the technique to set the minimum altitude warnings appropriate to the area. That gets briefed, but I don't know if it's regularly verbalized during missions. We emphasize that if pilots are working in the military operations area (MOA) they need to maintain MOA minimum altitude of 500', although you could technically transition through the MOA at 300'. We also preach that pilots need to use a scale for their moving maps that make the map usable to navigate with. My technique is to use a 10 mile scope. Flight discipline is important to the squadron, although there have been mistakes made. We do weapons review of every single tape.

I have known the Mishap Pilot (MP) fairly well for 5 years. I have flown with him. In my opinion, he is a highly professional pilot. I have a lot of trust in him. He was not wearing a helmet mounted cueing system on the mishap sortie. I am not aware of a case where he has violated flight rules. People with issues with flight discipline don't stay hidden. I did not notice any stress or changes in the MP's demeanor prior to the mishap. We typically don't have the same people flying together on a regular basis.

The 303rd FS wants to be known as a professional organization. Reduced flying hours hasn't really affected the squadron's proficiency or currency.

//Signed//

PRESTON J. McCONNELL, Lt Col, USAFR
Director of Operations, 303rd FS

Signed and sworn before me this ____ day of June 2013.

//Signed//

WILLIAM A. LYONS, Colonel, USAFR
President, Accident Investigation Board

SUMMARIZED STATEMENT OF

Lieutenant Colonel Stephen Joseph Nester

Lt Col Stephen Joseph Nester, appeared before the Accident Investigation Board, was sworn, and testified substantially as follows:

I, Lt Col Stephen Joseph Nester, of the 303rd Fighter Squadron (FS) at Whiteman Air Force Base (AFB), Missouri, after being placed under oath, hereby state that before my interview, the difference between the nature of an accident investigation board (AIB) under AFI 51-503 and a safety investigation board (SIB) under AFI 91-204 was explained to me. I understand the difference between an AIB and SIB. I acknowledge that the purpose of this AIB is to produce a publicly releasable report on the facts and circumstances surrounding this accident and to gather and preserve evidence for use in claims, litigation, disciplinary actions, adverse administrative proceedings, and for all other purposes. I understand that my AIB testimony may be used for any proper purpose and can be released to the public.

I am a Traditional Reservist. I was not on duty on 22 May 2013, the day of the mishap sortie. I have been the commander of the 303rd FS for 21 months. Lieutenant Colonel McConnell is the acting commander when I'm gone. I have been in the Air Force for 22 years and at the 303rd FS for 19 years. I have been an A-10 pilot since 1991 with about 2800 flying hours.

I got a call about the mishap on 22 May 2013, but I did not come in. I live in Indiana.

I have flown low altitude tactical navigation (LATN) over Stockton Lake in Missouri. I am aware of the wires near the area of the mishap. I don't recall any markers on the wires.

Standard procedure for obstacles is to call them out and get an acknowledgment. Unit pilots regularly comply with that standard. Minimum altitude warnings should be set for 500' when in the military operations area (MOA) and at 300' for LATN. There is no squadron standard for setting the scale of the tactical awareness display (TAD) moving map. Most of it is technique. We don't tell people how to run their TAD. It is not standard procedure to fly below the minimum altitude in the military operations area (MOA) or while doing low altitude tactical navigation (LATN) training. There is some confusion over the 300' minimum altitude for LATN, but the 500' minimum altitude in the MOA since the MOA overlaps LATN area. It's counterintuitive.

I have known the Mishap Pilot (MP) for 14 years. He is a prior enlisted crew chief. I have flown with him and would characterize him as an excellent pilot. He is one of the top four or five hardest working pilots in the squadron. I am aware he washed out of Weapons School. He had a difficult time there. A flying evaluation board was conducted for his failure at the school. He has had no disciplinary action for violating flight rules. I did not see any signs of stress in

the MP. He is a flight commander, is enrolled in Air War College, and is completing his Master's Degree. He's married to a dentist and they have three small children.

The character of the 303rd FS with regard to flight discipline, rules knowledge and adherence, and judgment is excellent. We did outstanding in the Operational Readiness Inspection and Consolidated Unit Inspection. We won the 10th Air Force top flying unit award. We are very particular about the people we hire.

//Signed//

STEPHEN J. NESTER, Lt Col, USAFR
Commander, 303rd FS

Signed and sworn before me this ____ day of June 2013.

//Signed//

WILLIAM A. LYONS, Colonel, USAFR
President, Accident Investigation Board

SUMMARIZED STATEMENT OF

GS-13/Maj Chad Andrew Carlton

Maj Chad A. Carlton appeared before the Accident Investigation Board, was sworn, and testified substantially as follows:

I, Maj Chad A. Carlton, of the 303rd Fighter Squadron (FS) at Whiteman Air Force Base, Missouri, after being placed under oath, hereby state that before my interview, the difference between the nature of an accident investigation board (AIB) under AFI 51-503 and a safety investigation board (SIB) under AFI 91-204 was explained to me. I understand the difference between an AIB and SIB. I acknowledge that the purpose of this AIB is to produce a publicly releasable report on the facts and circumstances surrounding this accident and to gather and preserve evidence for use in claims, litigation, disciplinary actions, adverse administrative proceedings, and for all other purposes. I understand that my AIB testimony may be used for any proper purpose and can be released to the public.

I am an Air Reserve Technician (ART). I was in civilian status on 22 May 2013, the day of the mishap sortie and was working on changes to A-10 publications. I have been in the Air Force Reserve since 2003. I was hired as a traditional reservist and was selected for an A-10 pilot position with the 303rd FS and after formal training was brought into the ART program in 2006. I have been the Chief of Weapons for the past year and a half and am responsible for all weapons-related training of the 303rd FS.

I have flown low altitude over Stockton Lake in Missouri. I am aware there were power lines in the area of the mishap site. I do not remember if there were any markers on those power lines that cross the lake.

The squadron standards discuss what flight members should do if they encounter any towers or obstacles along their route of flight. Flights should be briefing any towers or power lines along their planned route of flight. If I see an obstruction, "continue or climb" would be my call to my wingman. I would also give amplifying remarks regarding the nature of the object. After they see the obstacle they can return to lower level. If my wingman did not respond with "contact," I would be directive to climb. I believe all the units pilots comply with that squadron standard.

I have known the Mishap Pilot (MP) professionally and socially for over 12 years. I met him when he was a young Captain. I have flown with him a handful of times. I would rate him as an above average pilot. I have never seen the MP willfully violate flight rules. Prior to the mishap, I did not notice the MP was under any unusual stress. I did not see any unusual behavior.

Overall, my impression of the 303rd FS is that it is a solid, experienced unit that adheres to flight discipline, rules and procedures. Our unit is more restrictive on letting pilots into upgrade program, and is held to a higher standard than the Combat Air Force.

//Signed//

CHAD A. CARLTON, Maj, USAFR
Chief, Weapons, 303rd FS

Signed and sworn before me this ____ day of June 2013.

//Signed//

WILLIAM A. LYONS, Colonel, USAFR
President, Accident Investigation Board

A-10C, T/N 79-0164, 22 May 2013

**VERBATIM TESTIMONY
MAJOR SCOTT SIEMS**

My name is Colonel Bill Lyons. We are investigating the A-10C accident that occurred on 22 May 2013, near Whiteman Air Force, Missouri. This investigation, conducted under AFI 51-503, is separate and apart from the Safety Investigation conducted under AFI 91-204. The purpose of this investigation is to produce a publicly releasable report on the facts and circumstances surrounding this accident and to gather and preserve evidence for use in claims, litigation, disciplinary actions, and adverse administrative proceedings, and for all other purposes.

An interim Safety Investigation was previously conducted on the accident. Any testimony you may have provided before or during the interim Safety Investigation Board will be kept confidential, if you were so advised, and can be used only for accident prevention purposes. This board does not have access to any confidential testimony you gave before the interim safety investigation board. Your sworn testimony to us may be used for any proper purpose. Additionally, your testimony can be released to the public.

Q1 (PRESIDENT): Do you understand the difference between your testimony before and during any safety board and this accident board?

A1 (WITNESS): Yes.

Q2 (PRESIDENT): Your testimony will be under oath. Please raise your hand. Do you solemnly swear that the testimony you are about to give in the matter now under investigation shall be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

A2 (WITNESS): I do.

Q3 (PRESIDENT): Today is the 9th of June 2013. The time is now 1053, Central. This interview is being conducted in Building 48, Room 201, Whiteman Air Force base, Missouri. The persons present are the Witness; Major Scott Seims, Lt Col Jim Marks, the Pilot Advisor, Lt Col Paula McCarron, the Legal Advisor, Colonel Lewis Neace, the Medical Advisor, and Senior Airman Randy Huff, the Recorder, as well as myself [Colonel Bill Lyons, President.] The witness has been sworn.

Please state your full name and rank.

A3 (WITNESS): Scott Leroy Seims, Major.

Q4 (PRESIDENT): What status are you in today?

A4 (WITNESS): Today I am UTA.

Q5 (PRESIDENT): On 22 May, during the mishap sortie, what status were you in?

A5 (WITNESS): I was on a TP. I was on an additional Flight Training period.

Q6 (LEGAL ADVISOR): Is that a military status?

A6 (WITNESS): Yes.

Q7 (LEGAL ADVISOR): I am sorry. I just violated my rule. This is Lieutenant Colonel Paula McCarron.

Is that a military status?

A7 (WITNESS): Yes, Ma'am.

Q8 (PRESIDENT): How long have you served in the Air Force?

A8 (WITNESS): Just over twenty-two years.

Q9 (PRESIDENT): What is your current unit of assignment and location?

A9 (WITNESS): 303rd Fighter Squadron, Whiteman Air Force Base, Building 41.

Q10 (PRESIDENT): How long have you been with the unit?

A10 (WITNESS): Thirteen years.

Q11 (PRESIDENT): What is your current job title?

A11 (WITNESS): Simulator Instructor Pilot.

Q12 (PRESIDENT): How long have you been doing that?

A12 (WITNESS): Five months.

Q13 (PRESIDENT): Correct me if I am wrong, but that is a civilian position as the simulator instructor?

A13 (WITNESS): That is correct. So I do it both on military status and civilian status.

Q14 (PRESIDENT): Okay. That is fine. And prior to that, what was your job with the unit?

A14 (WITNESS): As a traditional reservist, being a fighter pilot and also working mission planning.

Q15 (PRESIDENT): Can you tell me your duties and responsibilities on 22nd of May 2013?

A15 (WITNESS): to be the flight lead, for Deuce Zero One Flight. It is a afternoon standard sortie.

Q16 (PRESIDENT): By standard sortie, what would that be?

A16 (WITNESS): No additional upgrade. It was just continuation training.

Q17 (PRESIDENT): We will get into the mission specifics here shortly. Can you give me a synopsis of your background and flying experience?

A17 (WITNESS): Yes. I have been flying ---or for a total flight time would be twenty-six years of flying. Previous to being a military pilot, I was an airline pilot. So I have been a flight instructor, cargo pilot, and then military. As far as military, just trainers and A-10.

Q18 (PRESIDENT): Can you give me a breakdown of the military flying? Where you were and what experience? How much time?

A18 (WITNESS): Flight time wise, in the military, I believe I have just over seventeen hundred hours of A-10 time, So I have put about nineteen hundred hours of total military flying. Other than the A10, here at Whiteman, it has just been training in T-38s and T-37's at Columbus Air Force Base, T-38 at Moody Air Force Base for Introduction to Fighter Fundamentals and then A-10 training at Tucson.

Q19 (PRESIDENT): But your only A-10 unit that you have been assigned to was the 303rd?

A19 (WITNESS): Correct.

Q20 (PRESIDENT): So on the day of the mishap, initially we are going to talk about you. On the day of the mishap, did you feel like you were well rested?

A20 (WITNESS): Yes.

Q21 (PRESIDENT): Had you complied with the crew-rest requirements from AFI 11-202, Volume 3?

A21 (WITNESS): Yes.

Q22 (PRESIDENT): Had you taken any medication the day of the mishap?

A22 (WITNESS): No.

Q23 (PRESIDENT): Over the last few months, have you had anything in your personal life or even your professional life that has happened that has kind of increased your stress or caused distraction?

A23 (WITNESS): My wife is pregnant.

Q24 (PRESIDENT): That will do it. How long has she been pregnant, if you do not mind me asking?

A24 (WITNESS): No problem. Twenty-two and one half weeks.

Q25 (PRESIDENT): Okay. First kid?

A25 (WITNESS): No, sir. Second kid.

Q26 (PRESIDENT): How old is your older?

A26 (WITNESS): Two and a half.

Q27 (PRESIDENT): Okay. When was the last time you visited a flight surgeon?

A27 (WITNESS): It would have been September of 2012, for my normal physical.

Q28 (PRESIDENT): Going to the mishap sortie, can you talk to me about what you did for mission planning preparation for the sortie?

A28 (WITNESS): Prior to, probably about an hour prior to the scheduled brief time, down in the mission plan vault, I devised my plan, so I planned on doing LATN, Low, Altitude, Tactical Navigation. Followed by some Maverick attacks, in Truman Charlie. Actually, back up a little bit, I forgot, we were doing Air Refueling, in Truman MOAs prior to that, and then a Low Altitude Tactical Navigation, then two to three Maverick attacks, in Truman Charlie, and then back in to land, since we only had a one point two.

Q29 (PRESIDENT): Just to clarify, Truman Charlie is the military ---military operating area that you utilize ---

A29 (WITNESS): ---Yes.

Q30 (PRESIDENT): ---for the air refueling and for the Maverick---

A30 (WITNESS): ---Yes. At the time, I believe we were going to be doing air refueling in Truman Alpha Bravo. So I did the mission planning for all that. I selected a route. I was going to do the Low Altitude Tactical Navigation sequencing. Then loaded our DTC's, our Digital Transfer Cartridge. Then printed out line-up cards, and then checked weather, and other pre-flight items.

Q31 (PRESIDENT): Did Major Leiter assist you in the mission planning?

A31 (WITNESS): I talked to him prior. I asked him what his needs were for that mission. He said he had none. Other than that, for mission planning, he did some of the paperwork as far as the operational risk management, and we both talked about the weather prior, to our brief with our supervisor of flying.

Q32 (PRESIDENT): So you said you picked the route that you were going to fly for the low altitude tactical navigation, was there a particular reason you picked it or decided to go down to the Stockton Lake area?

A32 (WITNESS): The main reason is off to the west, was that it is less populated, less busy. The other reason is just timing.

Q33 (PRESIDENT): Did Major Leiter make any requests to go down in that area?

A33 (WITNESS): No.

Q34 (PRESIDENT): That was your choice?

A34 (WITNESS): That was all my choice.

Q35 (PRESIDENT): Okay. All right. Had you, earlier, before the mishap sortie, have you flown down in the Stockton lake area?

A35 (WITNESS): Yes.

Q36 (PRESIDENT): Prior to the mishap, were you aware of the---referring to the map, with Stockton Lake here, and the mishap occurred down in this area, in the Southeast part of the lake--were you aware prior to the mishap sequence of the power lines that crossed the lake from north to south there?

A36 (WITNESS): I don't remember. As far as ---no.

Q37 (PRESIDENT): So, you have flown down in the Stockton Lake area, but were not necessarily aware that those power lines were where they were?

A37 (WITNESS): I knew ---I remember there being power lines, but the exact location---remembering? No.

Q38 (PRESIDENT): Okay. We obviously, have viewed the tape, the video of the mishap. So we have heard the communication that went on between you and your wingman. It is clear, based on a call that you make, that you see the obstruction out there. That you see---because the call is something to the effect of "wires at twelve o'clock." So, when you saw the wires---actually, my first question is what led you to make that call? What did you see that led you to make that call on the radio?

A38 (WITNESS): Actually, the call---what led me, my eyes---at the two o'clock position, I saw the power lines come into view---my two o'clock position. I saw the tower that is on the north side of the shore, and I saw the tower on the south side of the shore. I saw a little bit of a section of wire on each of those but I did not actually see the actual wires themselves.

Q39 (PRESIDENT): Out over the lake?

A39 (WITNESS): Out over the lake.

Q40 (PRESIDENT): That might answer my next question. Do you recall seeing any markers of any type on the wires out between the towers over the lake?

A40 (WITNESS): I do not recall.

Q41 (PRESIDENT): Okay. Can you describe for me the mission materials that you created for the mishap sortie? You said you printed a line-up card. Was there anything else that you produced? A map or anything else that you took?

A41 (WITNESS): No. Just a line-up card.

Q42 (PRESIDENT): So line-up card was the only actual piece of paper that you produced to take out to the jet?

A42 (WITNESS): Correct.

Q43 (PRESIDENT): Is that normal?

A43 (WITNESS): Yes.

Q44 (PRESIDENT): So let's talk about the briefing. Can you---rather than you just telling me--
-well, actually, I will ask. What did you use as a briefing guide for the brief?

A44 (WITNESS): I used our briefing room interactive. We call it BRI. I also used the map that
is under the plexi-glass on the table.

Q45 (PRESIDENT): So the Briefing Room Interactive is ---basis is an electronic briefing guide,
correct?

A45 (WITNESS): Correct.

Q46 (PRESIDENT): And did you cover all the required items from I guess it would be 11-2-
A10, Volume 3 briefing requirements?

A46 (WITNESS): Yes.

Q47 (PRESIDENT): Was Major Leiter attentive during the brief?

A47 (WITNESS): Yes.

Q48 (PRESIDENT): That day of the mishap, and through the brief, did he seem at all fatigued
or distracted?

A48 (WITNESS): No.

Q49 (PRESIDENT): Can you tell me what you briefed for minimum altitudes that you were
going to use for different phases of the flight or the different areas that you were going to be
working?

A49 (WITNESS): I briefed the Low Altitude Tactical Navigation. That would be no lower than three hundred feet. Then Truman Charlie would be five hundred feet. That would be our min altitudes.

Q50 (PRESIDENT): Did you talk about any techniques of how you were going to ensure that you did not violate those altitudes or descend below those altitudes before ---

A50 (WITNESS): Technique was to have the Altitude Alerter set, which I had set at my pre-mission planning at three hundred feet.

Q51 (PRESIDENT): So what was loaded in the data transfer cartridge was a three hundred foot altitude alert, correct?

A51 (WITNESS): Correct.

Q52 (PRESIDENT): So your plan---I guess I should have asked the order specifically that you were doing in the mission, but we watched the tape, and so it appeared that you took off, basically went right to the air refueling with the tanker in Truman Military Operating area---

A52 (WITNESS): [Witness nodding his head up and down.]

Q53 (LEGAL ADVISOR): Can I interrupt for a second, sir? You are nodding your head up and down which means yes, so, if you ---you need to respond verbally to questions and comments.

A53 (WITNESS): Yes, Ma'am.

Q54 (PRESIDENT): That is why I have her in here---

So, take off, directly to the tanker for the air refueling---

A54 (WITNESS): Yes, sir.

Q55 (PRESIDENT): ---from there, you descend off the tanker into Truman Charlie, for the Maverick

Attacks---

A55 (WITNESS): Yes, sir.

Q56 (PRESIDENT): From there, once you were done with the Maverick Attacks, you were going on to the Low Altitude Tactical Navigation?

A56 (WITNESS): Is how it happened, that is not how it was planned.

Q57 (PRESIDENT): Okay, what was the plan?

A57 (WITNESS): The plan was to do air refueling in Truman Alpha Bravo, then to descend down for the Low Altitude Tactical navigation which would be from Truman Alpha Bravo head to the Southwest to ---

Q58 (PRESIDENT): We are referring to the map---

A58 (WITNESS): Referring to the map---and right now, I cannot remember what point I put in there, but I believe---I don't remember what point I used. Either Delta 40 or Delta 30. One of those two points was my first point I had set in to the Data Transfer Cartridge. Then we talked about crossing over Victor or VR-1525, low altitude navigation training route, and that we were to fly south from Delta 30 towards Delta 6, and then swing over on top of Stockton Lake, and then go back to the northeast to go to Truman Charlie to execute our maverick Attacks and then recover back to Whiteman from Truman Charlie.

Q59 (PRESIDENT): So you were going to air refuel, then do the Low Altitude Tac Navigation, then the Maverick Attacks, then go home?

A59 (WITNESS): Correct.

Q60 (PRESIDENT): What ended up happening was you went to refueling, did the Maverick Attacks, then went to do the Low Altitude Tactical Navigation, correct?

A60 (WITNESS): Correct.

Q61 (PRESIDENT): What caused you to change the plan?

A61 (WITNESS): The tankers were in Truman Charlie instead of Alpha Bravo, so I decided since we already established inside the confines of Truman Charlie, it would make more sense just to knock out the Maverick attacks since we were already established in the Military Operating Area. And then to pick up the LATN, essentially fly in reverse routing of what I just briefed.

Q62 (PRESIDENT): And I assume, because I don't recall hearing that, that that change verbalized on the tapes but certainly not saying that it did not happen, but you communicated that change to Major Leiter, he understood that you were doing things a little differently?

A62 (WITNESS): Yes, sir. I believe I verbalized it right after the air refueling. I believe---I can't remember what I said exactly, but it seems like: "we are going to do the Maverick attacks first, then we are going to do the low altitude tac navigation." But it was before the Maverick attacks but after the tanker.

Q63 (PRESIDENT): Now maybe I do recall that that communication that went on. So, well then I suppose that answers the question I was going to ask about the altitude alerter being---that you had set during the Maverick attacks. So what do you recall of that?

A63 (WITNESS): We did the Maverick attacks. The floor was five hundred feet. I did not make a call to reset out altitude alerter.

Q64 (PRESIDENT): And would you normally do that?

A64 (WITNESS): I normally would. I think, my only guess right now, sir would be that my only---with the clouds, I potentially was task saturated and just missed the call.

Q65 (PRESIDENT): Fair enough. Is there a squadron standard---do you know---is there a squadron standard written as far as making those changes to the alerter? Is it a required call?

A65 (WITNESS): I don't believe it is a required a call.

Q66 (PRESIDENT): Would you say there is a widely used technique that folks use?

A66 (WITNESS): The only technique I would say is to update when you get into the new airspace. Some people do, some people don't.

Q67 (PRESIDENT): Do you normally verbalize it when you make the change just to ensure that everybody in the flight has made the adjustment?

A67 (WITNESS): Yes, sir. If I---Yes, sir.

Q68 (PRESIDENT): So, as you are doing your---actually, I will come to that question here in a minute. Is there any squadron guidance on utilization of the tactical awareness display with the moving map? As I understand, is utilized as an aid to help in identifying obstacles and avoiding them. Is there any guidance that tells you what range scale to use so that you have a map size that is readable so that you could actually see those obstacles?

A68 (WITNESS): Not that I am aware of.

Q69 (PRESIDENT): What is your technique?

A69 (WITNESS): My technique is five miles.

Q70 (PRESIDENT): So using a five mile scale and as I ---if I recall, on your display, that is five miles around a centroid track of your aircraft, right? So it's a five mile all the way around you would see on the display?

A70 (WITNESS): Correct. Correct, sir.

Q71 (PRESIDENT): Do you---would you---well, can you tell me what the squadron standards say, not verbatim certainly, but what the squadron standards say for obstacle detection and avoidance? What the flight is supposed to do if you have obstacles out there that become a factor?

A71 (WITNESS): Yes, sir. There is supposed to be a call sign directive descriptive. So you tell the person what you need them to do, if they need a change, and where that obstacle would be.

Q72 (PRESIDENT): Okay. And what if you made a call, say as a flight lead or a wing man, but you see an obstacle out there, you make that call on the radio, and what do you expect to hear back from your element mate?

A72 (WITNESS): I am expecting an acknowledgment back or I am going to hear a "no joy."

Q73 (PRESIDENT): So an acknowledgement. What do you want to hear? Just him respond with his flight position or do you need to hear something else from him?

A73 (WITNESS): I want to hear contact so---two contact. It doesn't always happen.

Q74 (PRESIDENT): If you don't hear that acknowledgement and the contact call indicating that the person that you are talking to sees the obstacle, then what do you do?

A74 (WITNESS): Usually direct a climb. I don't always. Being a pilot, and I know who I am flying with, I am only going to typically direct a climb if I hear "no joy." If you hear a simple acknowledgement, being a pilot, I know that they are acknowledging, so I am more looking for the "no joy." If I get anything else, they see it.

Q75 (PRESIDENT): Okay. Would you---is your sense that the pilots in the unit regularly comply with the standard as far as obstacle detection avoidance?

A75 (WITNESS): Yes.

Q76 (PRESIDENT): Did you brief anything specifically in your flight brief about the obstacles that you were expecting to see out there and anything that you were going to do to deal with those?

A76 (WITNESS): I would typically use a map, and talk about the general locations of where towers typically are. The roads, major highways, not any specific tower because there is no one tower that is rather tall.

Q77 (PRESIDENT): So on the route of flight that you were planning on doing, you didn't expect to come into contact with any obstacle that was going to be high enough at three hundred feet above the ground?

A77 (WITNESS): I believe the way I planned my route and the way I briefed it, was what towers we would come across we would just avoid laterally prior to ---the point where we had to climb.

Q78 (PRESIDENT): Can you tell me how you would brief the training rules?

A78 (WITNESS): With the Briefing Room Interactive. It goes to the ---I can't tell you what the Reg is right now, it goes to that page, and then talk about training rules as they are listed.

Q79 (PRESIDENT): So you have a, if you will, a link, on the briefing guide, that takes you to an AFI 11-214 Training Rules list of things?

A79 (WITNESS): Yes. Yes, sir.

Q80 (PRESIDENT): Do you remember what of those training rules you highlighted because there is a lot of them, I know that. Did you point out any of them specifically that would pertain to that sortie?

A80 (WITNESS): No. I want to say normal brief, so the air to ground stuff, low altitude, not any of the air to air stuff--- knock it off, going to call knock it off, if I remember.

Q81 (PRESIDENT): So, no specific mention of minimum altitudes during attacks---anything like that?

A81 (WITNESS): Not that I recall.

Q82 (PRESIDENT): As brought out as a specific emphasis item, I guess I should say?

A82 (WITNESS): No, not that I recall.

Q83 (PRESIDENT): So for the plan that you had for doing the Maverick training in the Truman area, can you tell me, and understanding that we altered the plan due to the tanker location, but can you tell me what you had planned for the Maverick deliveries? How were you going to orchestrate that and execute those attacks?

A83 (WITNESS): It was going to be a wedge of shooters---attack.

Q84 (PRESIDENT): Can you explain what that means?

A84 (WITNESS): All right. I picked out a target that is a standard target that we use south of Warsaw. It is a gravel pit that has construction vehicles. My plan was to attack the target for the most part from the south. So flying north --northwest towards the target. Starting around the point names Delta 12 and heading towards that point inside the northwest heading, and I was planning on the same attack, but slightly different geometry. Like I told him. So one attack he would be on the same side, then I was going to action, up and in. I was going to transition from the low altitude, climb up, get visual with the target, roll in, point the aircraft at the target with the Maverick, and pick the Maverick off, obviously training, and then my safe escape would be away from him and then the next one would be, he would cross my six o'clock, and then attack the target from the other side of my jet and as far as off target away from him for myself. And then back---

Q85 (PRESIDENT): Okay. That is fine. So what---when you are doing those attacks, what is the minimum altitude that you are allowed to operate at?

A85 WITNESS: Five hundred feet.

Q86 (PRESIDENT): So that five hundred foot minimum altitude is based on the air space?

A86 (WITNESS): Correct.

Q87 (PRESIDENT): It is not a minimum---it is not driven by a minimum altitude for employment of the weapon, correct?

A87 (WITNESS): Correct.

Q88 (PRESIDENT): So, when you were doing your attacks, do you recall anything out of the ordinary?

A88 WITNESS: I do. I did slightly go below five hundred feet and I called out because I debriefed myself right away and told two and corrected the situation as far as maintain my own situational awareness above five hundred feet AGL from then on.

Q89 (PRESIDENT): Do you recall what got your attention that you were down that low?

A89 (WITNESS): Just looking outside, looking at my radar altimeter.

Q90 (PRESIDENT): To me, and watching the tape, it appeared that what---because you were down there for awhile, what got your attention was the altitude warning, because again, you still had the three hundred foot bug in there. And I understand how that came about with the alteration of the plan and not making that correction.

A90 (WITNESS): [Witness was nodding his head up and down.]

Q91 (LEGAL ADVISOR): Let me interrupt again. You were again shaking your head up and down. So was that an agreement? This is Lieutenant Colonel Paula McCarron. Was that an agreement with Colonel Lyons' statement or do you recall the minimum altitude?

A91 (WITNESS): I do recall, so yes, in agreement.

Q92 (PRESIDENT): So it was that altitude warning that is what got your attention that you were that low and immediately after that you corrected the altitude back up---

A92 (WITNESS): That part I do not recall. I do recall knowing that I was down below five hundred and I need to correct.

Q93 (PRESIDENT): And then as you said, then you climb up about five hundred feet and then you make the radio call to set the bug at five hundred feet.

A93 (WITNESS): Sir, I don't believe I ---I don't remember saying reset the bug five hundred feet. I think at that point I was ---I don't remember exactly what I said other than we need to check altitude and maintain about five hundred.

Q94 (PRESIDENT): Okay.

A94 (WITNESS): At that point I know I was thinking that I can maintain myself above five hundred.

Q95 (PRESIDENT): Okay. So maybe not necessarily saying reset the bug, but you did make the call to check the altitude was my point. Okay. So, are you confident that Major Leiter was keeping up with and understood the change to the plan that you did when coming off the tanker and then just deciding to stay there and do the Maverick attacks?

A95 (WITNESS): Yes, sir.

Q96 (PRESIDENT): Did he have any questions during or after the brief or I will say really even anywhere up to the mishap event?

A96 (WITNESS): I do not recall.

Q97 (PRESIDENT): All right. During ground operations, before you took off, did Major Leiter indicate that he had any discrepancy or malfunction with any system or with his airplane?

A97 (WITNESS): Not that I recall.

Q98 (PRESIDENT): As you were going through your ground operations, getting ready for takeoff, did Major Leiter appear to be keeping up with the flow of what was going on? Did he seem rushed or anything give you any indication that he was becoming saturated or ---

A98 (WITNESS): No, Sir.

Q99 (PRESIDENT): Once you got airborne and going out to the tanker and then again with the changes and all to the plan in the order you were going to do things, did Major Leiter seem like he was keeping up with what was going on?

A99 (WITNESS): Yes, Sir.

Q100 (PRESIDENT): While you were airborne, did Major Leiter, and up until impacting the power lines, did Major Leiter indicate that he had any discrepancy or malfunction with the airplane?

A100 (WITNESS): Not that I recall.

PRESIDENT: I asked that question already. At this time, I think we will take a break.

[The time of the break was 1136 hours on 9 June 2013.]

[The interview of Major Seims resumed at 1140 hours on 9 June 2013.]

Q101 (PRESIDENT): So, to continue on---we are now up to talking about the mishap sequence. I am not necessarily going to define the mishap sequence but we'll say generally it will be in about the last two to three minutes prior to the impact with the cable. So, we fast forwarded to that part of the mission. So, during the mishap sequence, were you in a visual formation with Major Leiter?

A101 (WITNESS): Yes, Sir.

Q102 (PRESIDENT): Were you visual with his aircraft?

A102 (WITNESS): Yes, Sir.

Q103 (PRESIDENT): Do you recall the radio call that you made to Major Leiter about the power lines when you saw them?

A103 (WITNESS): Not exactly.

Q104 (PRESIDENT): What do you think---

A104 (WITNESS): I believe I said something ---"Continue power lines at twelve o'clock." That is about all I can remember. I would imagine that is what I would have said or I did say.

Q105 (PRESIDENT): Okay. Do you recall what his response was?

A105 (WITNESS): Not exactly. But I do know that it was not "no joy."

Q106 (PRESIDENT): Okay. At the time of the mishap, was there anything in the area of the mishap that you can recall that would have distracted Major Leiter or would have prevented him from seeing the wires?

A106 (WITNESS): Not that I know of. There was activity on the water. That was the only thing moving on the ground.

Q107 (PRESIDENT): Have you talked to him specifically, I know that there was communication on the radio and you were working with the supervisor of flying as you were coming home so there was communication between the aircraft, but beyond that, after you landed, have you talked to him at all about the mishap?

A107 (WITNESS): No, sir. No, sir.

Q108 (PRESIDENT): When we watched the tapes, there was some communication as you were all coming home, that I can't recall if it was with ---if it was between Major Leiter and the supervisor of flying or if it was between him and you. But do you recall discussion between either him and the supervisor of flying or him and you as you were on your way back, of him

saying what occurred ---you know, that he---relating as to whether or not he ever did see the wires?

A108 (WITNESS): To be honest with you, sir, I don't. I don't recall. Everything happened so quick. Yeah, I would have to review the tape. That would be it.

Q109 (PRESIDENT): Fair enough. I may have another question about the mishap sequence, but we'll come back to that. How long have you know Major Leiter?

A109 (WITNESS): Twelve years. Maybe thirteen. Twelve to thirteen years.

Q110 (PRESIDENT): Can you tell me the history that the two of you have together?

A110 (WITNESS): I met him after OTS but before pilot training when I first met him, so 2001. Fall of 2001.

Q111 (PRESIDENT): When did you meet him? How did you meet him back then?

A111 (WITNESS): In the squadron. I think he had just got delayed training or was in between training and I was in between training so we were both Lieutenants.

Q112 (PRESIDENT): So it was his first assignment---or is this his only A-10 assignment as well?

A112 (WITNESS): Correct. This is his only A-10 assignment.

Q113 (PRESIDENT): So in effect, the two of you were hired basically at the same time?

A113 (WITNESS): Yes, I think he was I want to say two years behind me in the hiring sequence.

Q114 (PRESIDENT): So you said you met him before you went to pilot training?

A114 (WITNESS): I believe, yes.

Q115 (PRESIDENT): And what was he doing then?

A115 (WITNESS): I think he had broken his leg, maybe? He was in between training. Or he was back here ---I think he was back here---he broke his leg in A-10 training, or something, so he was back here recuperating for a little bit. So he was in the squadron. We were both in the squadron just kind of waiting for the next training cycle.

Q116 (PRESIDENT): So, sorry, I am trying to put together a timeline. Which one of you got hired first?

A116 (WITNESS): He did. Major Leiter got hired I believe 1998 and I got hired, yeah, fall of 2000.

Q117 (PRESIDENT): So he got hired, went off to pilot training, started A-10 training, something happened, broke his leg or whatever, came back here, then you, as you were getting ready to roll, that is where you met him---

A117 (WITNESS): Correct, sir.

Q118 (PRESIDENT): ---before he had gone back to do his course?

A118 (WITNESS): Correct. I am almost positive it was after OTS but before I went to pilot training.

Q119 (PRESIDENT): And so you went through the pipeline, got your A-10 training and you both have been in the unit together ever since?

A119 (WITNESS): Correct, sir.

Q120 (PRESIDENT): Can you describe or tell me what the nature is of your relationship with him? Are you just colleagues? Co-workers? Friends? Do you spend time together?

A120 (WITNESS): We are friends. We spend time. Our families spend time together.

Q121 (PRESIDENT): How much? How often do you?

A121 (WITNESS): On an average for a year, our families probably see each other four to six times a year.

Q122 (PRESIDENT): That is obviously outside of what would otherwise be normal, if you would, normal squadron social functions?

A122 (WITNESS): Correct.

Q123 (PRESIDENT): So this would be on top of that?

A123 (WITNESS): Correct.

Q124 (PRESIDENT): Are you aware of anything that has happened in his life? Any life events or any other factors that have gone on with him that would create undue or unusual stress for him or distractions or maybe lead to fatigue or other issues?

A124 (WITNESS): No, sir.

Q125 (PRESIDENT): Before this mission, had you flown with Major Leiter before?

A125 (WITNESS): Yes, sir.

Q126 (PRESIDENT): How much would you say?

A126 (WITNESS): I would say we probably fly together on average once every other month, so six times a year, about.

Q127 (PRESIDENT): How would you characterize him as a pilot?

A127 (WITNESS): Excellent.

Q128 (PRESIDENT): And he is an instructor now, correct?

A128 (WITNESS): Yes, sir.

Q129 (PRESIDENT): And you are an instructor as well?

A129 (WITNESS): Yes, sir.

Q130 (PRESIDENT): Did he upgrade to instructor before you?

A130 (WITNESS): Yes, sir.

Q131 (PRESIDENT): Do you know about how much before?

A131 (WITNESS): My only guess would probably be three years before.

Q132 (PRESIDENT): Three years?

A132 (WITNESS): Before I did.

Q133 (PRESIDENT): So you had a chance while he was instructor to watch him and either decide to emulate him or not as the type of instructor you would like to be?

A133 (WITNESS): Yes, sir.

Q134 (PRESIDENT): Have you ever witnessed either directly or if you went out and flew together, come back in the debrief or through discussion with other people in the squadron, have you ever witnessed Major Leiter violating any flight rules?

A134 (WITNESS): No, sir.

Q135 (PRESIDENT): Just to close a previous question, have you noticed anything over the last couple of days to the last couple of months maybe, any change in his demeanor or how he behaves?

A135 (WITNESS): No, sir.

Q136 (PRESIDENT): So, now off of Major Leiter and to a broader question, this is the only A-10 unit other than your training unit that you went through that you have flown in, correct?

A136 (WITNESS): Correct.

Q137 (PRESIDENT): What is your impression of this unit as it pertains to flight discipline, knowledge, adherence of rules and procedures, and so I guess generally just overall professionalism of the unit?

A137 (WITNESS): Excellent.

Q138 (PRESIDENT): Would you have any assessment, I suppose, of the reputation that this unit has among the broader A-10 community?

A138 (WITNESS): As far as I understand, we have a very good reputation amongst the community.

Q139 (PRESIDENT): All right. Going back, sorry, real quick to the mishap, of when it occurred, weather didn't appear to me on the tape to be an issue, was there any problem with the weather?

A139 (WITNESS): No, sir.

Q140 (PRESIDENT): Visibility was---

A140 (WITNESS): Visibility was excellent. Clouds were---there were clouds---actually I think it was scattered out at the time. If I remember, at least above five thousand, if not higher. They had to be because we ---yeah, they were higher---above five thousand.

Q141 (PRESIDENT): Did you notice any bird activity that would have driven any maneuvering?

A141 (WITNESS): No, sir. I watch bird activity and I saw no birds.

Q142 (PRESIDENT): You mentioned that you saw activity on the water. I presume that is boats driving around on the water.

A142 (WITNESS): Yes, sir.

Q143 (PRESIDENT): Leading up to basically at the point just prior to impact into the wires, did you see any boats in that area?

A143 (WITNESS): I remember seeing two boats, but it was somewhere between where we --- before we started over the water and the location of the power lines. I remember seeing two

boats. They were exact position of---I remember they were off to my left. That is all I remember from ---

Q144 (PRESIDENT): So if you are out flying around over Lake Stockton, or any other lakes in the area out here, and I won't even necessarily put you on the spot, if you have ---if squadron pilots are flying around over the lakes out there, and there is boat activity, there are boats running around on the ground, would you say it is unusual or normal that perhaps guys would be, when they see a boat, turn to point, fly over it, and I am not necessarily saying that they are violating any rule, I mean they can do it as long as they are meeting clearance criteria in the Air Force Instructions, but do guys normally do that?

A144 (WITNESS): No, sir.

Q145 (PRESIDENT): So from that, can I, have you ever witnessed Major Leiter doing that before?

A145 (WITNESS): No, sir.

Q146 (PRESIDENT): Alright. So the final question I have and this is just to clean up an item for you, were you informed by your medical personnel that you were supposed to be providing an annual update to support a waiver that you are on for flying?

A146 (WITNESS): They just told me when---they told me to get paperwork from my doc, but I can't say, it seems like an annual, it seems like it is, I just kind of get the paperwork when I am told.

Q147 (PRESIDENT): So, if I go back and don't know and don't care to know what the waiver is, but when you had the waiver approved, you do not recall the medical squadron saying, okay, with this waiver, annually you need to provide an update?

A147 (WITNESS): No, sir.

Q148 (PRESIDENT): But you have been reminded or told since that waiver went in place that you needed to provide something to the medical squadron?

A148 (WITNESS): Yes, Sir.

Q149 (PRESIDENT): Have you done that? Have you provided what they asked for?

A149 (WITNESS): In the past. Yes. I am working on it right now actually for the newest, I guess, update to the waiver. I am working on the paperwork that I need with my doc who I see regularly.

Q150 (PRESIDENT): So as you understand it, does that qualify what was supposed to be an annual update or is that to provide what they need to renew the waiver? Any inkling?

A150 (WITNESS): I guess, sir? No.

Q151 (PRESIDENT): So you had a PHA last September, your birth month I presume is around September? Sorry. Preventive Health Assessment.

A151 (WITNESS): Yes, sir. Yes.

Q152 (PRESIDENT): When you did the one in September of last year, do you recall anyone, flight surgeon, or any medical technician telling you that you needed to provide an update at that time to I guess continue the waiver?

A152 (WITNESS): What I recall is he made me start getting information for down the road. So, at that time, I think I told him I had an appointment October, November timeframe.

Q153 (PRESIDENT): Who were you talking to? Was it a flight surgeon?

A153 (WITNESS): I don't remember if it was a flight surgeon that was from C Springs or if it was one of the med techs, I don't remember who the conversations were happening with.

(PRESIDENT): Doctor Neace, does that answer the questions you have?

(FLIGHT SURGEON): Yes it does. This is Colonel Lewis Neace, Board Flight Surgeon.

(PRESIDENT): That is all of the questions that I have. So I am going to go around the table to make sure we did not miss anything. Lieutenant Colonel Marks, anything?

(PILOT MEMBER): Lieutenant Colonel Marks, Board Pilot member.

Q154 (PILOT MEMBER): What was your brief formation at the time of the mishap?

A154 (WITNESS): Wedge.

Q155 (PILOT MEMBER): Did you observe or note any visual illusions at that time of day heading to the west?

A155 (WITNESS): No, sir.

Q156 (PILOT MEMBER): Did you look at Major Leiter after your tower call? Did you physically turn your head and look at him to see him?

A156 (WITNESS): No, sir. I was unable. At that point he was in a trail formation just because of the way that I turned and moved the formation to a trail temporarily.

(PILOT MEMBER): That is all the questions I have.

(PRESIDENT): Colonel Neace, do you have any questions?

(FLIGHT SURGEON): Colonel Lewis Neace, Board Flight Surgeon, I have one question.

Q157 (FLIGHT SURGEON): Were you flying with sunglasses?

A157 (WITNESS): No, Sir.

(FLIGHT SURGEON): Thank you. I have no further questions.

(PRESIDENT): Back to the Board President.

Q158 (PRESIDENT): Do you know if he was?

A158 (WITNESS): I do not know, sir.

Q159 (PRESIDENT): Do you know if he flies with glasses or if he has contact lenses?

A159 (WITNESS): I don't believe so.

(PRESIDENT): Lieutenant Colonel McCarron?

Q160 (LEGAL ADVISOR): Are you an Air Reserve Technician now?

A160 (WITNESS): No.

Q161 (LEGAL ADVISOR): Oh. So you are---are you still a TR then in the squadron?

A161 (WITNESS): Yes.

Q162 (LEGAL ADVISOR): And on 22 May, you were doing military training period for that whole day?

A162 (WITNESS): Correct. Just for that four hour segment covering that flight, and after.

Q163 (LEGAL ADVISOR): So you've got a civilian job on the outside?

A163 (WITNESS): Yes, ma'am.

Q164 (LEGAL ADVISOR): What do you do in your civilian job?

A164 (WITNESS): I am the GS-13 Simulator Instructor Pilot in the Squadron.

Q165 (LEGAL ADVISOR): Oh, that is not an ART position?

A165 (WITNESS): Correct.

(LEGAL ADVISOR): That is why I asked.

Q166 (LEGAL ADVISOR): You mentioned that you and Major Leiter are friends and that your families spend time together and the families hang out four to six times a year, on average. Is that right?

A166 (WITNESS): That sounds about right. Yes, ma'am.

Q167 (LEGAL ADVISOR): Do you and Major Leiter spend time together just you and he outside of squadron functions?

A167 (WITNESS): At times. Not very often.

Q168 (LEGAL ADVISOR): Have you seen him since the mishap?

A168 (WITNESS): Yes, ma'am.

Q169 (LEGAL ADVISOR): Have you seen him outside the squadron since the mishap?

A169 (WITNESS): No, ma'am.

(LEGAL ADVISOR): That is it.

(PRESIDENT): Okay. That will conclude the interview. You are reminded of the official nature of this interview. You may not discuss your testimony with anyone without my permission until the public release of the report of this investigation.

(WITNESS): Yes, Sir.

INTENTIONALLY

LEFT

BLANK

SUMMARIZED STATEMENT OF

MSgt Keith Dennis Pawenski

MSgt Keith Pawenski appeared before the Accident Investigation Board, was sworn, and testified substantially as follows:

I, MSgt Keith Pawenski, of Detachment 303, 495th Fighter Group at Whiteman Air Force Base, Missouri, after being placed under oath, hereby state that before my interview, the difference between the nature of an accident investigation board (AIB) under AFI 51-503 and a safety investigation board (SIB) under AFI 91-204 was explained to me. I understand the difference between an AIB and SIB. I acknowledge that the purpose of this AIB is to produce a publicly releasable report on the facts and circumstances surrounding this accident and to gather and preserve evidence for use in claims, litigation, disciplinary actions, adverse administrative proceedings, and for all other purposes. I understand that my AIB testimony may be used for any proper purpose and can be released to the public.

I am on active duty. I have been in the Air Force for over 20 years and arrived at Whiteman Air Force Base in August 2012. I became the dayshift Flightline Production Superintendant in January 2013. My role is to lead, supervise, and prioritize maintenance activities, and accomplish scheduled maintenance actions while planning for the current day and future flying and maintenance schedule. On 22 May 2013, I preformed and documented the Exceptional Release on aircraft 79-0164. The Exceptional Release documents that an aircraft is ready for the pilot and is airworthy. To perform an Exceptional Release, I need to do a forms review to ensure that all documented grounding maintenance is complete and no scheduled inspections are overdue. Additionally, I perform a cursory walk around of the aircraft to verify that there are no visible airworthiness concerns. Aircraft 79-0164 had no noticeable safety of flight issues and was ready for flight. It was a spare aircraft for the first launches, but was not used. The aircraft was flown on the second go, which is when the mishap took place. During the launch sequence for aircraft 79-0164, I was not present on the flightline and was not on duty at the time of recovery.

//Signed//

KEITH D. PAWENSKI, MSgt, USAF
Production Superintendant, Det 303, 495th Fighter Group

Signed and sworn before me this ____ day of Jun 2013.

//Signed//

WILLIAM A. LYONS, Colonel, USAFR
President, Accident Investigation Board

INTENTIONALLY

LEFT

BLANK

SUMMARIZED STATEMENT OF

WL-10/TSgt Brian Wayne Gillespie

Mr. Brian Gillespie appeared before the Accident Investigation Board, was sworn, and testified substantially as follows:

I, Mr. Brian Gillespie, of the 442d Aircraft Maintenance Squadron at Whiteman Air Force Base, Missouri, after being placed under oath, hereby state that before my interview, the difference between the nature of an accident investigation board (AIB) under AFI 51-503 and a safety investigation board (SIB) under AFI 91-204 was explained to me. I understand the difference between an AIB and SIB. I acknowledge that the purpose of this AIB is to produce a publicly releasable report on the facts and circumstances surrounding this accident and to gather and preserve evidence for use in claims, litigation, disciplinary actions, adverse administrative proceedings, and for all other purposes. I understand that my AIB testimony may be used for any proper purpose and can be released to the public.

I am an Air Reserve Technician and was on civilian status on 22 May 2013. I have been in the Air Force for 13 years, all of them at Whiteman AFB. I have been an A-10C Dedicated Crew Chief for 3 years. On 22 May 2013, I was dispatched to End of Runway (EOR) as a tow supervisor to recover and tow back aircraft 79-0164, that had declared an In Flight Emergency. When I arrived at the North Hammerhead, the emergency vehicles were already there. I made contact with the on-scene commander from the Fire Department and the night shift maintenance production superintendent, WS-12/CMSgt Harter, and was granted permission to establish communication with the Mishap Pilot (MP), safe the aircraft, and commence shutdown procedures. I was the first one to talk to the MP.

After establishing communication, the pilot asked if all of his Bomb Dummy Unit (BDU)-33s, were still on. A BDU-33 is a small practice bomb that has a powder smoke charge used for marking where the bomb impacted when performing bombing practice. I told him they were all there, but one was turned sideways. He said he had no right system hydraulics. I began the normal shutdown procedures, but due to the damage to the hydraulic systems, I told the pilot not cycle the flight controls prior to shutdown. After shutdown, I discussed with the pilot if he would be riding brakes back to the parking ramp. It is normal procedures to have a pilot ride brakes back from EOR. He said that he probably couldn't ride brakes back because he would have to take a urinalysis test. The maintenance chief gave me permission to let him ride brakes back. At that time the pilot highlighted that he had no emergency brake pressure. As a result, we "chalk walked" the aircraft back to the ramp. Chalk walking an aircraft requires technicians to carry aircraft parking chalks next to main landing gear. The tow vehicle cannot go over 5 miles per hour.

During preparation to tow the aircraft, I told the MP that I was surprised he made it back. He asked if I thought he would have ejected. I told the MP "it could have been a lot worse"

because I had heard he hit power lines. After a 45 minute tow from the North Hammerhead to parking spot H1, I departed the aircraft where the awaiting crew locked down the aircraft.

//Signed//

BRIAN W. GILLESPIE , WL-10/TSgt, USAFR
Dedicate Crew Chief, 442d Aircraft Maintenance Sq

Signed and sworn before me this ____ day of Jun 2013.

//Signed//

WILLIAM A. LYONS, Colonel, USAFR
President, Accident Investigation Board

SUMMARIZED STATEMENT OF **WS-09/ TSgt Carolyn Sue Schafer**

Ms. Carolyn Schafer appeared before the Accident Investigation Board, was sworn, and testified substantially as follows:

I, Ms. Carolyn Schafer, of the 442d Aircraft Maintenance Squadron at Whiteman Air Force Base, Missouri, after being placed under oath, hereby state that before my interview, the difference between the nature of an accident investigation board (AIB) under AFI 51-503 and a safety investigation board (SIB) under AFI 91-204 was explained to me. I understand the difference between an AIB and SIB. I acknowledge that the purpose of this AIB is to produce a publicly releasable report on the facts and circumstances surrounding this accident and to gather and preserve evidence for use in claims, litigation, disciplinary actions, adverse administrative proceedings, and for all other purposes. I understand that my AIB testimony may be used for any proper purpose and can be released to the public.

I am an Air Reserve Technician and was on civilian status on 22 May 2013. I have been in the Air Force for 30 years and recently became an Aircraft Overhaul Supervisor on 27 Jan 2013. I perform the role of the Nightshift Flightline Expeditor. My responsibilities include assigning work and providing support and guidance for the overall maintenance production effort. On 22 May 2013, the day of the aircraft mishap, I reported to duty around 1430. I was informed via Land Mobile Radio, that an In-Flight Emergency was declared on A-10C aircraft 79-0164. It was broadcast on the radio that the aircraft had hit power lines. I coordinated and dispatched an experienced tow team in preparation of recovery and possible tow of the aircraft. When the tow team returned to the ramp it was being "chalk walked," that is, it was towed without aircraft power or braking capability, by the maintenance crew with the pilot in the cockpit. When the aircraft reached the parking spot, the pilot got out. He did appear shaky, but I did not make any contact with him. At that time we took oil samples and began to secure the aircraft for a possible investigation.

//Signed//

CAROLYN S. SCHAFER, WS-09/TSgt, USAFR
Flightline Expeditor, 442d Aircraft Maintenance Sq

Signed and sworn before me this ____ day of Jun 2013.

//Signed//

WILLIAM A. LYONS, Colonel, USAFR
President, Accident Investigation Board

INTENTIONALLY

LEFT

BLANK

SUMMARIZED STATEMENT OF

GS-09/TSgt Donald Ray DeMarco

Mr. Donald DeMarco appeared before the Accident Investigation Board, was sworn, and testified substantially as follows:

I, Mr. Donald DeMarco, of the 442d Aircraft Maintenance Squadron at Whiteman Air Force Base, Missouri, after being placed under oath, hereby state that before my interview, the difference between the nature of an accident investigation board (AIB) under AFI 51-503 and a safety investigation board (SIB) under AFI 91-204 was explained to me. I understand the difference between an AIB and SIB. I acknowledge that the purpose of this AIB is to produce a publicly releasable report on the facts and circumstances surrounding this accident and to gather and preserve evidence for use in claims, litigation, disciplinary actions, adverse administrative proceedings, and for all other purposes. I understand that my AIB testimony may be used for any proper purpose and can be released to the public.

I am an Air Reserve Technician and was on civilian status on 22 May 2013. I have been in the Air Force for over 8 years and have been assigned to the Aircraft Debrief office. I have been assigned to the Aircraft Debrief office for 2 years. This office is responsible for interfacing with the pilot after every sortie to gather and document in the Integrated Maintenance Data System airframe flight time and pilot reported discrepancies identified during that flight. I was on shift during the mishap on 22 May 2013. I was anticipating the mishap pilot to debrief with me, but he never came in after the mishap. After inquiring with the nightshift production superintendent, I was verbally told to document the mishap as a grounding write-up "Aircraft Damaged in Flight." I did so, and assigned it job control number 131425052. After loading that job, I was directed to lock down the aircraft's forms and database records for a possible investigation.

//Signed//

DONALD R. DEMARCO, GS-09/ TSgt, USAFR
Aircraft Debrief, 442d Aircraft Maintenance Sq

Signed and sworn before me this ____ day of Jun 2013

//Signed//

WILLIAM A. LYONS, Colonel, USAFR
President, Accident Investigation Board

INTENTIONALLY

LEFT

BLANK

SUMMARIZED STATEMENT OF

WL-8852-10/ TSgt Kenneth Ray Campbell

Mr. Kenneth Campbell appeared before the Accident Investigation Board, was sworn, and testified substantially as follows:

I, Mr. Kenneth Ray Campbell, of the 442d Aircraft Maintenance Squadron at Whiteman Air Force Base, Missouri, after being placed under oath, hereby state that before my interview, the difference between the nature of an accident investigation board (AIB) under AFI 51-503 and a safety investigation board (SIB) under AFI 91-204 was explained to me. I understand the difference between an AIB and SIB. I acknowledge that the purpose of this AIB is to produce a publicly releasable report on the facts and circumstances surrounding this accident and to gather and preserve evidence for use in claims, litigation, disciplinary actions, adverse administrative proceedings, and for all other purposes. I understand that my AIB testimony may be used for any proper purpose and can be released to the public.

I am an Air Reserve Technician. I was in civilian status on 22 May 2013, the day of the mishap sortie. As the Dedicated Crew Chief on A-10C Aircraft 79-0164, I have managed the maintenance on this aircraft for 6 years. This aircraft recently came out of a number 2 Phase Inspection on 13 May 2013, and was required a Functional Check Flight. This flight profile operationally checks out the aircraft at all altitudes, speeds, and attitudes. The aircraft flew Code 1 (no pilot reported discrepancies) on the Functional Check Flight on 13 May 2013. The aircraft also flew Code 1 during a local sortie on 21 May 2013. I am a night shift maintenance technician. After Aircraft 79-0164 landed on 21 May 2013, I performed the Basic Post-Flight and Pre-Flight inspection. During this inspection, I verified fuel, liquid oxygen, oil, and hydraulic servicing levels on the aircraft. Subsequently, I serviced fuel preparing it for flying on 22 May 2013. I performed all the inspection requirements in accordance with the work cards, and signed off the inspection on the Air Force Technical Order Form 781H at 2330 hours. By signing off this inspection on the aircraft form, I documented that this aircraft had no airworthiness concerns and was prepared for flight for the next day. This aircraft has no history of any intermittent system malfunctions. On the day of the mishap I reported to duty and was part of the team that received the aircraft from the end of runway and secured it for a possible investigation.

//Signed//

KENNETH R. CAMPBELL, WL-10/TSgt, USAFR
Dedicated Crew Chief, 442d Aircraft Maintenance Sq

Signed and sworn before me this ____ day of Jun 2013

//Signed//

WILLIAM A. LYONS, Colonel, USAFR
President, Accident Investigation Board